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DISABILITY WITHOUT DOCUMENTATION
Katherine A. Macfarlane*
Disability exists regardless of whether a doctor has confirmed its
existence. Yet in the American workplace, employees are not disabled, or
entitled to reasonable accommodations, until a doctor says so. This Article
challenges the assumption that requests for reasonable accommodations
must be supported by medical proof of disability. It proposes an
accommodation process that accepts individuals’ assessments of their
disabilities and defers to their accommodation preferences.
A
documentation-free model is not alien to employment law. In evaluating
religious accommodations, employers—and courts—take a hands-off
approach to employees’ representations that their religious beliefs are
sincere. Disability deserves the same deference. This Article also
contributes a novel analysis of agency guidance by exploring how its support
of medical documentation requirements conflicts with legislative intent and
the Americans with Disabilities Act’s rejection of the medical model of
disability.
Documenting disability has its price. It requires access to affordable
health care and a relationship with a health care provider who is willing to
confirm a disability’s existence. Documentation requirements may delay an
urgently needed accommodation—one that would, for example, permit an
employee to work from home. Until documentation requirements are
relaxed—if not eliminated—disabled employees may be forced to work in
dangerous conditions, or not work at all.
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INTRODUCTION
Disability is idiosyncratic. It can be intensely private like the early
morning moments during which an individual with disabilities transfers from
bed to wheelchair. Disability can be unavoidably public: when the same
person flags down a bus, other passengers bear witness as a platform lift
raises the wheelchair and its user off the ground. Disabilities such as visual
impairments are obvious if they require use of familiar adaptive equipment,
like white walking sticks. Disabilities like lupus may hide in plain sight. To
some, disability may feel like a prison. Others believe that disability is a
gift—a pathway to empathy, a showcase for resilience.
Like disability, faith is not universal. It has its private moments like
solitary, silent prayer. It has its public moments like a sacrament celebrated
before friends and family. Faith may be obvious when it is accompanied by
specific and identifiable attire, such as a vestment, or it may be invisible to
others like a crucifix hidden beneath a high-collared shirt. Faith can be
confining, or it can be freeing. Some may hide their religious beliefs, while
others proudly assert them.
Disability, like faith, is often shaped by personal experience. An
individual may assert that she is disabled because she knows that her spinal
cord injury is a physical impairment that substantially limits her ability to
stand and requires the use of a wheelchair. At work, she may ask for a
reasonable accommodation that requires the purchase of a desk under which
a wheelchair will fit. But an employer need not accept an employee’s
assertion that her disability requires a wheelchair or accept her
recommendation that she be given an appropriate desk. In evaluating a
request for reasonable accommodations made pursuant to the Americans
with Disabilities Act1 (ADA), employers may require their disabled
employees to prove that they are disabled by showing medical
documentation. Employers may demand access to employees’ medical
records and test results or require detailed doctor’s notes. If an employee
asserts that she is disabled but cannot provide sufficient medical
documentation to support her claim, her assertions are meaningless.
Not all requests for workplace accommodations are so closely scrutinized.
An employee assigned to work on Saturday may ask to work a different day
to accommodate his religious practices if the employee believes, as a result
of his faith, that Saturday is a day of rest. In most instances, the employee
will not be required to document his religious beliefs to support the
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
and 47 U.S.C.).
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accommodation request. The employee’s beliefs need not be held by all
members of the employee’s faith. Whether the employee is doctrinally
correct in his interpretation of the commands of his faith is also irrelevant.
Religious beliefs are hands-off.
This Article uses the law of workplace accommodation to examine why
employees must submit documentation to demonstrate that they are disabled
but need not document their religious beliefs.
The need to revolutionize reasonable accommodations is urgent. First, the
documentation-heavy reasonable accommodation process may be so onerous
that it contributes to the underemployment of people with disabilities.2 The
medical documentation requirement is likely influenced by the widespread
belief that people who claim disability are faking it. Doron Dorfman explains
that American society suffers from a moral panic he labels the “fear of the
disability con.”3 This fear leads to “[t]he second-guessing of a person’s
disability and of that person’s need for an accommodation.”4 As a result,
people with disabilities must constantly prove that they are disabled.5 The
proof required by the reasonable accommodation process may force
individuals with disabilities to work without the accommodations they need
to succeed or simply not work at all.6 Disability itself is already significantly
2. See Katie Eyer, Claiming Disability, 101 B.U. L. REV. 547, 561 (2021) (stating that
“employment levels of people with disabilities remain very low, despite the desire of many
people with disabilities to be employed”); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mothers with Disabilities,
33 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 75, 77–78 (2018) (explaining that employment was key to
realizing the ADA’s equal opportunity goal but that individuals with disabilities are still
employed “at a much lower rate than nondisabled individuals”).
3. Doron Dorfman, Fear of the Disability Con: Perceptions of Fraud and Special Rights
Discourse, 53 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1051, 1051 (2019).
4. Id. at 1078.
5. See id. at 1079. The Trump administration also appeared to be motivated by fear of
the disability con. See Robert Pear, On Disability and on Facebook?: Uncle Sam Wants to
Watch What You Post, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/03/10/us/politics/social-security-disability-trump-facebook.html
[https://perma.cc/
ZYA2-GQPC]. It threatened to surveil the social media posts of individuals receiving Social
Security disability benefits in search of evidence that those who claimed to be disabled were
actually active and happy—behavior supposedly inconsistent with disability. See id. The
Trump administration also proposed subjecting recipients of Social Security disability benefits
to frequent eligibility reviews, which the administration justified as a way of identifying
disability fraud. See Jake Johnson, Applause as Biden Withdraws ‘Horrific’ Trump Rule
Attacking Social Security Disability Recipients, COMMON DREAMS (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2021/01/28/applause-biden-withdraws-horrifictrump-rule-attacking-social-security-disability [https://perma.cc/44UP-J7DP]. On January
28, 2021, the Biden administration abandoned any such effort. See id.
6. See, e.g., Susan G. Goldberg et al., The Disclosure Conundrum: How People with
Psychiatric Disabilities Navigate Employment, 11 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 463, 468 (2005)
(describing how difficult the reasonable accommodations process can be for employees with
hidden disabilities who must disclose the nature of their disabilities, a decision that “entails
substantial risk to their careers” (quoting Sharon L. Harlan & Pamela M. Robert, The Social
Construction of Disability in Organizations:
Why Employers Resist Reasonable
Accommodation, 25 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 397, 411 (1998))); David B. Goldstein, Ethical
Implications of the Learning-Disabled Lawyer, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 114–15 (2000)
(describing how a newly hired disabled attorney who requests reasonable accommodations
may fear “ostracism, less responsibility and assumptions about incompetence” and explaining
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underclaimed by those who might in theory benefit from civil rights
protections.7
Second, certain workplaces may be unsafe for people whose disabilities
place them at high risk of severe cases of COVID-19. Streamlining the
reasonable accommodation process, and separating it from medical
documentation, would permit a new class of employees to continue to work
safely from home.8
Almost one in four adult workers in the United States are at risk of severe
illness from COVID-19, including those who have asthma.9 Though asthma
is a disability recognized by the ADA,10 before the pandemic, an individual
with asthma may have given little thought to reasonable accommodations.
Now, since asthma may increase the risk of severe illness from COVID-19,11
employees with asthma or others who are high-risk may seek a reasonable
But
accommodation permitting them to work from home.12
work-from-home requests are not automatically granted, even during a
pandemic.13 Employees may be required to prove, with a doctor’s note, that
their need to work from home is real.14
On March 27, 2020, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) held a webinar concerning the application of federal equal
opportunity laws, including the ADA, during the pandemic.15 The EEOC
explained that employees with disabilities that put them at “greater risk of
severe illness” if they contract COVID-19 may qualify for a reasonable

that if accommodations are not sought and disability is instead hidden, “the decision . . . may
doom the attorney to failure by not getting the necessary support staff assistance, supervision
or technical support”).
7. See Eyer, supra note 2, at 551–52 (stating that society’s continued association of
disability with “functional incapacity and an inability to work” may be the cause of this
hesitancy to claim disability).
8. Of course, many high-risk employees are also essential workers or otherwise unable
to complete their work at home.
9. See Gary Claxton et al., Almost One in Four Adult Workers is Vulnerable to Severe
Illness from COVID-19, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 15, 2020), https://www.kff.org/
coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/almost-one-in-four-adult-workers-is-vulnerable-to-severeillness-from-covid-19/ [http://perma.cc/6V84-QVN5].
10. See, e.g., Shine v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 19-cv-04347, 2020 WL 5604048, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2020) (stating that “asthma can substantially limit one’s ability to engage
in the major life activity of breathing and thus constitute a disability under the ADA”).
11. See COVID-19: People with Certain Medical Conditions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extraprecautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html
[http://perma.cc/98XY-EN2L]
(last
updated May 13, 2021).
12. See Transcript of March 27, 2020 Outreach Webinar, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/transcript-march-27-2020-outreach-webinar#q17
[http://perma.cc/3J4K-5TTJ] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
13. See, e.g., Claudia Bellofatto, University of Florida Professors Speak Out on In-Person
Classes Controversy, WCJB (Nov. 23, 2020, 7:27 PM), https://www.wcjb.com/2020/11/24/
university-of-florida-professors-speak-out-on-in-person-classes-controversy/
[https://perma.cc/8XKH-32YP].
14. See Transcript of March 27, 2020 Outreach Webinar, supra note 12.
15. See id.
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accommodation pursuant to the ADA.16 It also addressed medical
documentation requirements but did not suspend them.17 Instead, the EEOC
cautioned that “many doctors may have difficulty responding quickly” and
that disabilities can be verified in other ways—for example, with “a health
insurance record or a prescription.”18
This Article is the first to question whether requests for reasonable
accommodation in the workplace must be supported by medical
documentation of disability. It proceeds in three parts. Following this
introduction, Part I describes the ADA’s rejection of the medical model of
disability and the way the reasonable accommodation requirement, in
particular, embodies the ADA’s commitment to the social model of
disability. Part I then explores how employers and courts, with the support
of agency guidance, have nevertheless refused to recognize disability or
adopt an employee’s proposed accommodations without supporting medical
documentation. It contributes a novel analysis of agency guidance, exploring
how the EEOC’s medical documentation framework contradicts legislative
intent.
In Part II, this Article proposes a simple solution: applying the hands-off
approach courts currently take with respect to religious beliefs to disability.
Part II reconceptualizes disability-based accommodations, envisioning a
process in which an employee’s representation that they are disabled
establishes that they are disabled. The Article concludes by explaining how
centering the experiences of individuals with disabilities might also
revolutionize how reasonable accommodations are treated in education and
beyond.
I. DOCUMENTING DISABILITY AT WORK
This part reviews the ADA’s embrace of the social model of disability. It
explains how Title I of the ADA, which governs employment, illustrates the
ADA’s commitment to the social model. This part also describes the ADA
drafters’ vision of the “interactive process,” which would be used to identify
appropriate reasonable accommodations. Moreover, this part highlights that
legislative history makes no mention of medical documentation. This part
next explores how courts have nevertheless converted the interactive process
into a medical inquisition. Finally, it attributes this error to interpretive
guidance concerning the ADA’s medical inquiries and examinations
provisions.

16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Id. The EEOC suggested that employers provide requested accommodations on a
temporary basis “where the request is for telework or leave from an employee whose disability
puts them at higher risk.” Id.
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A. Divorcing Disability from the Medical Model
Like the Civil Rights Act of 1964,19 the ADA was designed to bring about
a “culture shift.”20 A radical approach was necessary to end disabled
Americans’ second-class citizenship. Indeed, the ADA’s legislative history
is replete with examples of disabled Americans’ underprivileged status,
including their poverty.21
Data regarding disabled Americans’ unemployment confirmed the need
for the ADA’s employment provisions.22 A 1986 poll revealed that about
two-thirds of working-age individuals with disabilities were unemployed, a
rate exceeding that “of all other demographic groups under age sixty-five of
any significant size.”23 The same poll documented that most nonworking
people with disabilities wanted to work.24 Committee reports noted that
“about 8.2 million people with disabilities want to work but cannot find a
job.”25
Gainful employment is key to independence and dignity, and it is essential
to facilitating self-sufficiency.26 After all, “[a] good job contributes to our
self-worth, offers membership in a community, provides benefits like health
insurance, and is critical to financial stability and independence.”27
Inaccessible workplaces made gainful employment impossible for
individuals with disabilities. To meaningfully impact unemployment, the
ADA would need to permanently alter the American workplace.
The ADA aimed to change the workplace in two ways. First, it prohibited
adverse employment decisions based on disability.28 Second, unlike
19. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
20. Louis S. Rulli & Jason A. Leckerman, Unfinished Business: The Fading Promise of
ADA Enforcement in the Federal Courts Under Title I and Its Impact on the Poor, 8 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 595, 599 (2005). The disability rights movement was informed by the African
American civil rights movement and borrowed its ingenuous strategies. See Laura L. Rovner,
Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1059 (2004) (explaining that
“disability advocates have ‘employ[ed] the language from [other civil rights] movements,
decrying patterns of hierarchy and subordination based upon physical differences’”
(alterations in original) (quoting Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 621, 660 (1999))).
21. See, e.g., Arlene Mayerson, Title I—Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 499, 499 (1991).
22. See id.
23. Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,
420 (1991).
24. Id. at 421.
25. Id. at 422 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 9 (1989)).
26. See, e.g., Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 857 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating
that the ADA was concerned with providing individuals with disabilities gainful employment
to facilitate “dignity, financial independence, and self-sufficiency”).
27. Alison Barkoff & Emily B. Read, Employment of People with Disabilities: Recent
Successes and an Uncertain Future, 42 HUM. RTS., no. 4, 2017, at 8, 8.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (defining the term “discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability” as including “limiting, segregating, or classifying a job
applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such
applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee”).
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traditional civil rights laws, the ADA also imposed an affirmative obligation
on employers, requiring that they “assist employees in satisfactorily
performing the essential functions of the job” by making reasonable
accommodations in the workplace.29 Therefore, failing to make a reasonable
accommodation for an applicant or employee who is “otherwise qualified”
constitutes disability discrimination prohibited by the ADA.30
Carrie Griffin Basas has described the ADA as a “social project” that
would “dismantle the systemic economic and employment discrimination
faced by people with disabilities in all work settings.”31 Reasonable
accommodations would accomplish the repurposing of the American
workplace.32 After all, as Mark Weber has explained, the accommodation
mandate “requires changes in the way things have always been done in order
to permit people with disabilities to integrate into society on a plane equal to
that of others.”33
Employers are required to make reasonable accommodations when an
individual with disabilities seeks employment, and employers must also
provide access to the privileges associated with employment.34 If an
employer provides “cafeterias, lounges, gymnasiums, auditoriums,
transportation and the like,” each must be accessible.35 In some cases,
making reasonable accommodations may require employers to implement
physical or structural changes.36 For example, an employer may need to
provide a ramp for an employee who uses a wheelchair.37 Making reasonable
accommodations may also alter how a job is performed by, for example,
“reallocating or redistributing marginal job functions that an employee is
unable to perform because of a disability” or “altering when and/or how a
function, essential or marginal, is performed.”38
The duty to make reasonable accommodations is only owed to employees
who are qualified, defined by the ADA as those who “with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the

29. Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1045, 1047–48 (2000).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
31. Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable Accommodation and
Resistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 67 (2008).
32. Id. at 67.
33. Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV.
1119, 1122 (2010).
34. See Mayerson, supra note 21, at 516.
35. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., § 1630.9 (2020).
36. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating
that the ADA may require altering employers’ “difficult-to-navigate restrooms and
hard-to-open doors”).
37. See Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact,
and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 880 (2006).
38. Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the
American with Disabilities Act, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002), 2002 WL
31994335.
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employment position that such individual holds or desires.”39 Also,
employers are not required to make accommodations that would impose an
undue hardship on a business’s operation.40
The ADA does not describe how accommodations are to be identified and
implemented.41 However, courts have uniformly required employers and
employees to engage in what is termed the “interactive process” to determine
what accommodations will be made.42 Scholars have traced the interactive
process to a 1989 Senate committee report.43 The report envisioned a
“problem-solving approach” to accommodations.44 It emphasized that the
employee’s experience and knowledge should be centered. For example, the
report provided that “[a]fter receiving a request for an accommodation by an
employee, employers are encouraged to solicit suggestions for reasonable
accommodations from the employee/applicant.”45 It also highlighted how an
employee’s accommodation suggestion “is often simpler and less expensive
than the accommodation the employer may have envisioned, resulting in a
win-win situation for the employee and employer.”46
According to the report, a more involved process is required only if “the
person with the disability is not familiar enough with the job and the
employer is not familiar enough with the disability to devise an appropriate
accommodation.”47 In that scenario, the report envisioned a process that
would first identify the “barriers to equal opportunity.”48 Employer and
employee would then work together to identify “the essential and
nonessential tasks of the position” and “the abilities and limitations of the
employee,” settling on “tasks or aspects of the job that the employee is
precluded from performing effectively.”49 Next, “possible accommodations
must be identified.”50 Again, the employee’s preferences control. The report
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Relevant regulations arguably define “qualified” more
narrowly. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2020) (defining a qualified employee as one who
“satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the
employment position such individual holds or desires” and can, “with or without reasonable
accommodation, . . . perform the essential functions of such position”).
40. See Mayerson, supra note 21, at 513–14. A discussion of what constitutes an undue
hardship is beyond the scope of this Article.
41. See Dallan F. Flake, Interactive Religious Accommodations, 71 ALA. L. REV. 67, 74
(2019). Flake argues that the ADA’s interactive process should be required in the religious
accommodations context. See id. at 107–14; see also infra Part III.A (discussing Flake’s
argument).
42. Flake, supra note 41, at 74.
43. The ADA’s “committee reports were considered extensively and relied upon as an
accurate statement of the meaning of the ADA,” which “reflects a very open and honest
legislative debate.” Ruth Colker, The ADA’s Journey Through Congress, 39 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1, 47 (2004); Flake, supra note 41, at 74.
44. Flake, supra note 41, at 74 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 34 (1989)); see also
Mayerson, supra note 21, at 515–16.
45. Mayerson, supra note 21, at 515 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 34).
46. Flake, supra note 41, at 74.
47. Mayerson, supra note 21, at 516.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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instructed employers to “first consult the employee, followed by
consultations with various employment agencies familiar with the needs of
disabled workers.”51 The Senate report does not contemplate resorting to
medical documentation during the interactive process. The present approach
to reasonable accommodations ignores this key legislative history, instead
mandating an experience that is punitive, adversarial, and humiliating. The
present approach betrays the drafters’ vision.
In 1991, the EEOC issued regulations implementing Title I of the ADA,
which provided that an interactive process “may be necessary” to determine
“the appropriate reasonable accommodation.”52 The regulations explained
that the interactive process “should identify the precise limitations resulting
from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could
overcome those limitations.”53 The regulations also do not reference
providing medical documentation of disability during the interactive process.
Whereas the regulations provide that the interactive process “may” be
necessary, the EEOC’s interpretive guidance states that “[t]he appropriate
reasonable accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive
process that involves both the employer and the individual with a
disability.”54 The process outlined by the guidance “closely tracks” the
process outlined by the Senate Committee report “but places even greater
emphasis on the employee’s role in the process.”55 Indeed, the EEOC
requires that an employer consult with an employee “not only to identify
possible accommodations but also to assess their potential effectiveness.”56
If “two equally effective accommodations are available,” the EEOC gives the
employee’s preference “primary consideration.”57
If consultation with the employee does not identify feasible
accommodations, the employer is directed to consider whether “technical
assistance” may help determine “how to accommodate the particular
individual in the specific situation.”58 Technical assistance “could be sought
from the Commission, from State or local rehabilitation agencies, or from
disability constituent organizations.”59
Like the ADA’s legislative history and relevant regulations, the EEOC’s
guidance does not reference medical documentation in its description of the
interactive process.
The employee’s own suggestions regarding
accommodations serve as the starting point. Healthcare providers are not
identified as individuals from whom technical expertise might be sought.

51. Id.
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2020).
53. Id.
54. Flake, supra note 41, at 76 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630, app., § 1630.9 (2019)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 77.
57. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., § 1630.9 (2019)).
58. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., § 1630.9 (2020).
59. Id.
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This Article reveals the central role health care providers and medical
records play in the interactive process, despite the legislative history,
regulations, and guidance that treat a disabled person’s expertise as
controlling. In addition to this conflict, reliance on health care providers and
medical records converts the interactive process into one that is steeped in
the medical model of disability.
The drafters of the ADA intended to reject the medical model, which
focuses on diagnoses, treatment, and rehabilitation. The medical model
sidelines individuals with disabilities, giving them little say over their own
identities. Before the ADA’s passage, federal disability law and policy
“focused on changing, fixing, or training the disabled person to help him
overcome his disability and adapt to the ways of ‘normal’ society.”60
Disability was treated as a biological condition. Pursuant to the medical
model, a disabled individual is helped through either “rehabilitation efforts
to enable the individual to overcome the effects of the disability, or medical
efforts to find a cure for the individual.”61 The medical model perceives an
individual’s disability as “personal misfortune” with no social cause.62
The medical model of disability grants tremendous power to health care
professionals. Physicians “validate the existence of disability” and serve as
gatekeepers to social assistance.63 Pursuant to the medical model, “[t]he
individual’s own subjective experience of impairment or limitation is
irrelevant unless it can be professionally validated.”64 Validation requires a
physician, who alone can “diagnose or categorize the cause of an
impairment” and also “measure and document its functional impact.”65
The ADA’s modern view of disability “is a dramatic change in
perspective, from a medical state to be cured and pitied, or tolerated when
‘worthy,’ towards acceptance and accommodation of difference as part of the
human experience and individual identity.”66 The ADA conceptualizes
disability through a social model, in which disability is a “multi-faceted
societal oppression . . . distinguished from the physiological notion of
impairment.”67

60. Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35
GA. L. REV. 27, 56 (2000).
61. Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of the
Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 186 (2008).
62. See id.
63. Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 650
(1999).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Peter Blanck, Why America Is Better Off Because of the Americans with Disabilities
Act and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 35 TOURO L. REV. 605, 609 (2019).
67. Areheart, supra note 61, at 188; see also Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry
in Antidiscrimination Law, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 69, 120 (“[T]he ADA was meant to create a
new way of thinking about disability—that those with disabilities are not intrinsically limited,
but instead have been held back by environmental features that can be changed.”).
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This social model of disability treats the obstacles encountered by the
disabled as “social structures and practices” which society should remedy.68
As Carrie Griffin Basas explains, the social model of disability “promotes
the idea that people with disabilities become disabled by societal perceptions
of their difference or ‘deviance’ from the norm, rather than by any intrinsic
difference in worth, ability, or potential.”69 Disability is a social construct
“crafted and advanced by non-disabled people,” who influence society’s
“architecture and infrastructure.”70 If institutions and structures are not
designed for universal access, accounting for “the spectrum of human needs
and ways of doing things,” they will exclude anyone who does not “look, act,
think, move, read, or behave ‘normally.’”71
Title I’s requirement that employers make reasonable accommodations
reflects the social model. It “calls for employers to recognize that they
collectively have created an employment environment that makes some
mental and physical conditions disabling.”72
Writing in 2007, Deidre Smith found that in most ADA litigation, plaintiffs
must introduce medical evidence to prove that they are disabled so they can
avoid summary judgment.73 The insistence on medical proof of disability
reinforces a “deep-seated skepticism of those ‘claiming disability’ generally
and ADA plaintiffs specifically.”74 In 2008, Brad Areheart theorized that the
medical model of disability remained entrenched and that the ADA’s social
view of disability was only a “symbolic victory” over the medical model.75
“Despite the ADA’s conceptual bent,” Areheart explained, “a social view of
disability has not taken root in America.”76
Over ten years later, the medical model of disability endures. As explained
below, the medical model shapes the interactive process. When disabled
employees do not provide medical documentation of disability, courts hold
that they have not participated in good faith in the interactive process and
therefore cannot bring failure-to-accommodate claims against their
employers. An employer need not accommodate disabled employees who
cannot back up their self-proclaimed disabilities with medical proof.

68. Areheart, supra note 61, at 189.
69. Basas, supra note 31, at 95–96.
70. See id. at 96.
71. Rovner, supra note 20, at 1062.
72. Elizabeth Dalton, The Overall Financial Interest of Individuals with Disabilities:
Justifying the Motivating Factor Standard, 12 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 231, 247 (2016); see also
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 435
(2000) (“By requiring individualized accommodation, these provisions . . . remove socially
contingent barriers to the full integration of people with physical and mental impairments.”).
73. See Deirdre M. Smith, Who Says You’re Disabled?: The Role of Medical Evidence in
the ADA Definition of Disability, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007).
74. Id.
75. Areheart, supra note 61, at 183.
76. Id. at 192.
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B. Medical Documentation and the Interactive Process
Failure-to-accommodate cases reveal the sharp contrast between how the
interactive process was intended to function and how it actually proceeds.
The cases discussed below demonstrate that though conceived as informal,
the interactive process through which employers evaluate employees’
reasonable accommodation requests has become burdensomely formal for
the disabled employees. In practice, employees cannot explain what their
own “precise limitations” are, nor can they suggest “potential reasonable
accommodations,” as the ADA’s legislative history recommends. Rather, a
medical provider, typically a doctor, must verify that an employee is disabled
and identify what accommodations are needed.
A failure to provide medical documentation of disability during the
interactive process has significant legal consequences. When disabled
employees do not provide their employers with medical documentation,
employers need not provide requested accommodations, and the interactive
process ends. Courts assign responsibility for a breakdown in the interactive
process to disabled employees who fail to provide medical documentation of
their disabilities.77 When an employee is deemed responsible for this kind
of breakdown, the employee cannot claim disability discrimination based on
a failure to accommodate.
When courts assess failure-to-accommodate claims, suspicion abounds
about whether an employee is in fact disabled and entitled to
accommodations. The leading cases described below highlight courts’
willingness to doubt employees’ accounts of their disabilities. The cases
underscore the belief that a failure to provide medical documentation of
disability is suggestive of disability fraud.78 The documentation-heavy
interactive process that courts endorse bears almost no resemblance to the
employee-centric process outlined by the ADA’s legislative history and
relevant guidance.
The oft-cited EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Market, Inc.79 is emblematic.
There, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a grocery store did not violate the
ADA when it required employee Steven Sharp, a produce clerk who
informed Prevo’s that he was HIV positive, to submit to a medical
examination to confirm his diagnosis.80 Prevo’s endorses an employer’s
refusal to accept an employee’s own assertion that he is disabled.
77. See Stacy A. Hickox & Keenan Case, Risking Stigmatization to Gain Accommodation,
22 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 533, 573 (2020) (“An employee’s failure to provide requested medical
information is commonly used to justify either an employer’s termination of the interactive
process and/or the employee’s discharge.”); see also John F. Birmingham, Jr., The Interactive
Accommodation Process: Cooperate or Pay the Price, 77 MICH. BAR J. 1044, 1045 (1998).
78. See Dorfman, supra note 3, at 1055 (explaining how “the suspicion of fakery has been
engrained in the legal treatment of disability”). Dorfman found that “the suspicion of
disability con has a pernicious effect on the lives of many people with disabilities.” Id. at 1079.
“People with disabilities often need to prove their disabilities daily, not only to health
professionals or judges but also to ordinary people,” a process that “takes its toll.” Id.
79. 135 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir. 1998).
80. Id. at 1090–91.
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In January 1993, Sharp informed his employers that he planned to speak
at a local high school event focused on AIDS awareness.81 Because the
children of several Prevo’s employees attended the school, Sharp shared his
HIV status with Prevo’s to ensure that his employer would hear the news
first.82 Following a conversation with the grocery chain’s president
regarding Sharp’s HIV status, Sharp was reassigned from the produce area
to the store’s receiving area.83 After his transfer, other employees asked
questions about his reassignment and commented about their “disrupted
work schedules.”84 To “get Sharp out of the situation of being asked
questions and to give Prevo’s a chance to get the information that they needed
to properly handle the situation,” Sharp and Prevo’s agreed that Sharp would
be placed on paid leave.85
While discussing his leave of absence, “Sharp promised his employer that
he would obtain verification of his HIV condition from his personal
physician and furnish the information to his employer.”86 By November
1993, Sharp had yet to provide the promised information.87 Prevo’s asked
Sharp to submit to a medical examination by an infectious disease expert at
Prevo’s expense.88 Prevo’s wanted the expert, Dr. Baumgartner, to assess
whether “future treatment would require Sharp to be absent from work” and
“whether Prevo’s should consider assigning Sharp to office work.”89 Prevo’s
also wanted the expert to provide an opinion about “the transmittal of HIV
on tools and produce” and “the degree of risk Sharp posed to customers and
co-workers in the produce position.”90 Despite Sharp’s assertion that he was
HIV positive, Prevo’s also wanted Dr. Baumgartner to “provide a complete
diagnosis and prognosis concerning whether Sharp tested positive for HIV,”
as well as “hepatitis or any related conditions.”91
Though he was never examined by Dr. Baumgartner, Sharp provided a
letter from his physician confirming his negative hepatitis and tuberculosis
tests.92 Prevo’s deemed the information insufficient as it did not address
Sharp’s HIV “diagnosis, prognosis, or suitability for employment.”93 In
81. Id. at 1091.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. While recounting these facts, the court interjects commentary that undercuts
Sharp’s experience, writing that “[i]t was not at all clear why Sharp experienced discomfort
at being asked about the reason for the change in his work assignment since Sharp had
indicated his desire to perform public speaking in connection with an AIDS awareness and
education program.” Id. The court cannot imagine that an employee may wish to speak about
his disability on his own terms in a supportive environment, as opposed to being subjected to
intrusive questions in the workplace. There is a difference.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1091–92.
88. Id. at 1092.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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December 1993, after refusing to schedule an appointment with Dr.
Baumgartner, Sharp was terminated.94
At issue in Prevo’s was the ADA’s general prohibition on
employer-mandated medical examinations and inquiries that seek to establish
that an employee “is an individual with a disability” or to obtain information
about “the nature or severity of the disability.”95 Such examinations or
inquiries are only permitted when they are “job-related and consistent with
business necessity.”96 According to Prevo’s, a medical examination would
determine whether Sharp “could safely perform the function of his job
involving cuts and scrapes without exposing others to HIV infection.”97 The
EEOC argued that a medical examination was unnecessary, as the same
information could be obtained from the employee himself or by consulting
health care officials.98 But the Sixth Circuit agreed with Prevo’s. A
“significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by
reasonable accommodation” is a direct threat.99 The court explained that
“[b]ecause of the frequency of bleeding in the produce area, Prevo’s needed
to verify Sharp’s medical condition, determine whether he had other
conditions associated with HIV, and determine whether he was aware of and
able to follow safety procedures to reduce or eliminate any risk of
infection.”100 Therefore, Prevo’s could require Sharp to submit to a medical
examination because the examination would determine whether he posed a
“significant risk to the health or safety of others” that could not be eliminated
by reasonable accommodation.101
Prevo’s addresses what an employer may require of an employee when the
employer believes that the employee may pose a direct threat to others in the
workplace.102 It is not a case about the interactive process, as Sharp never
94. Id.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
96. Id.
97. Prevo’s, 135 F.3d at 1095.
98. Id.
99. Id. (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3); then citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996)).
100. Id. at 1094. This statement was powerfully countered in Judge Kimberly A. Moore’s
dissent, which noted that since the ADA’s enactment, “neither HIV nor AIDS has ever
appeared on the list of infectious diseases that could be communicated through the handling
of food,” choosing “fear, prejudice, and ignorance” instead of medical evidence. Id. at 1099–
100.
101. Id. at 1101 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3)). An employer does not commit disability
discrimination when the employer denies a job or benefit to an individual with a disability
who poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others in the workplace. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12113(a), (b); see also Elisa Y. Lee, Note, An American Way of Life: Prescription Drug
Use in the Modern ADA Workplace, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 303, 324–25 (2011)
(“Courts have consistently recognized that a person cannot be considered a qualified
individual with a disability under the ADA if the person poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others in the workplace that cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.”).
102. For a discussion of the court’s direct threat analysis, see Rebecca Trapp, Medical
Examination or Objective Medical Evidence: What Is the Correct Procedure to Determine If
an Employee Infected with the HIV Virus Presents a Direct Threat Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act—EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Market, Inc., 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1585, 1586–
87 (1999).
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asked for a reasonable accommodation.103 Still, Prevo’s mentions
accommodations in dicta, stating that an employer “need not take the
employee’s word . . . that the employee has an illness that may require special
accommodation.”104 Though not germane to its holding, this statement has
had a lasting impact on reasonable accommodation law.
The case explains why an employee’s own account of disability should not
suffice, warning that “[i]f this were not the case, every employee could claim
a disability warranting a special accommodation yet deny the employer the
opportunity to confirm whether a need for the accommodation exists.”105
The court characterized documentation of disability as essential to
“employer-employee co-operation” and stated that it would “promote an
interactive dialogue between an employer and employee to discover to what
extent the employee is disabled and how the employee may be
accommodated, if at all, in the workplace.”106
Prevo’s not only suggests that an employee’s own statement that they are
disabled is not sufficient but also further treats as a lie Sharp’s claim that he
is HIV positive.107 Despite Sharp’s statement that he was HIV positive, the
court contended that “it is unknown by all of the parties that have ever been
associated with this case whether Sharp is HIV positive.”108
Prevo’s has been criticized on several grounds.109 It is an opinion that
reads at best as dated and, at worst, as representative of the thinly veiled
homophobia surrounding HIV and AIDS. And, as the dissenting opinion
emphasized, information about the “likelihood and imminence of infection
could be determined without resort to a medical examination of Sharp.”110
Rather than requiring a medical examination, Prevo’s could have consulted
with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.111
Far less attention has been paid to the pronouncement in Prevo’s that an
“employer need not take the employee’s word for it that the employee has an
illness that may require special accommodation.”112 Though rooted in the
court’s desire to malign Sharp and discredit his representations about his own
health, this aspect of Prevo’s survives. It has taken on a life of its own,
despite its problematic origins. The language has been used to justify medical
103. Prevo’s, 135 F.3d at 1097 (expressly declining to address Prevo’s argument that there
was no way to reasonably accommodate Sharp in the workplace).
104. Id. at 1094.
105. Id. at 1094–95.
106. Id. at 1095.
107. Id. at 1096 (“[Sharp’s] refusal to submit to a company-paid examination prevented
Prevo’s from ever knowing Sharp’s HIV status.”).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Steven H. Aden, HIV/AIDS and the Public Accommodations Provisions of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 395, 414 (2000); Ann
Hubbard, Understanding and Implementing the ADA’s Direct Threat Defense, 95 NW. U. L.
REV. 1279, 1318–19 (2001); Melanie D. Winegar, Note, Big Talk, Broken Promises: How
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act Failed Disabled Workers, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1267, 1295 (2006).
110. Prevo’s, 135 F.3d at 1102 (Moore, J., dissenting).
111. Winegar, supra note 109, at 1295.
112. Prevo’s, 135 F.3d at 1094.
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examinations and inquiries outside of the direct threat context. It is arguably
one of the most influential—and harmful—federal Title I opinions.
Yet, over time, Prevo’s has been repackaged as an interactive process
case.113 The Southern District of Ohio has cited Prevo’s in holding that “[n]o
discrimination occurs where employment is terminated as a result of an
employee’s refusal to engage in the interactive process” by refusing to submit
to a medical examination.114 The Eastern District of Tennessee has cited
Prevo’s in support of its conclusion that an employee impeded the interactive
process when the defendant employer “requested substantiating medical
information, and plaintiff did not provide it.”115 The Western District of
Kentucky has cited Prevo’s in connection with its conclusion that defendant
employers did not violate the ADA “by requiring medical proof of her need
for accommodations.”116
The Fifth Circuit has cited Prevo’s in assessing whether an employee
participated in the interactive process.117 Prevo’s has also been cited in
reasonable accommodation cases decided by district courts outside of the
Sixth Circuit.118 The Sixth Circuit itself has quoted and misapplied Prevo’s,
using its proviso that an employee’s own contention that the employee is
disabled need not be taken at face value in the context of the interactive
process.119
Just as Prevo’s endorses rejecting employees’ claims that they are
disabled, courts have also rejected failure-to-accommodate claims when the
accommodations were suggested by the employee instead of a doctor. In
both instances, the employee-centric approach envisioned by the ADA’s
legislative history, regulations, and interpretive guidance has been
abandoned. For example, in Reyes v. Krasdale Foods, Inc.,120 the court
rejected a failure-to-accommodate claim because the disabled employee’s
requested accommodation was not specifically supported by documentation
provided by the employee’s doctor.121 Wilfredo Reyes brought a
113. See Sloan v. Repacorp, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 891, 900 (S.D. Ohio 2018).
114. Id. (citing Prevo’s, 135 F.3d at 1096).
115. Harvey v. Am.’s Collectibles Network, Inc., No. 09-CV-523, 2011 WL 182864, at *8
(E.D. Tenn. Jan. 20, 2011) (holding that because of plaintiff’s failure to participate in the
interactive process, she “cannot claim that defendant failed to accommodate her under the
ADA”); see also Mynatt v. Morrison Mgt. Specialist, Inc., No. 12-CV-303, 2014 WL 619601,
at *13 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 2014); Israel v. Tenn. Dep’t of Mental Health & Developmental
Disabilities, No. 04-CV-314, 2006 WL 2559710, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 5, 2006) (citing
Prevo’s in concluding that during the interactive process, the defendant employer “was
entitled to require that plaintiff provide some substantiation of his alleged disability” before
granting an accommodation to permit him to work an earlier shift).
116. Gardner v. W. Kentucky Univ., No. 11-cv-79, 2015 WL 5299451, at *3 (W.D. Ky.
Sept. 9, 2015), aff’d, No. 15-6121 (6th Cir. July 5, 2016).
117. See Delaval v. PTech Drilling Tubulars, L.L.C., 824 F.3d 476, 482 (5th Cir. 2016).
118. See, e.g., Blackmon v. Ingalls, No. 15CV313, 2016 WL 4120751, at *7 (S.D. Miss.
July 28, 2016).
119. See Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs., 974 F.3d 652, 670 (6th
Cir. 2020); Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 656 (6th Cir. 2000).
120. 945 F. Supp. 2d 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
121. Id. at 492–93.
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failure-to-accommodate claim alleging that his employer, Krasdale,
“improperly denied his request to shift his schedule forward by thirty
minutes, from a 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. shift, to a 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
shift.”122 The schedule shift was Reyes’s preferred accommodation and the
one he suggested.123
The parties agreed that Reyes was disabled as a result of Type 1
diabetes.124 The thirty-minute schedule change would have permitted Reyes
to administer an injection that rendered him dizzy and nauseous while he was
at home, instead of forcing him to inject himself while driving home.125
Reyes’s doctor had advised him “to alter his meal and injection schedule to
achieve the best results.”126 However, because Reyes did not believe he had
to provide his employer with “details about his medical condition,” the
doctor’s note Reyes provided to Krasdale stated that Krasdale should
“accommodate [plaintiff’s] working hours” but did not recommend a specific
adjustment.127
The court found that, despite the doctor’s note, Reyes failed to provide
sufficient medical documentation justifying the schedule change.128 The
letter did not state that Reyes’s work schedule should be altered “for
whatever variety of reasons,” and, therefore, Krasdale did not have enough
medical documentation to agree to the thirty-minute accommodation.129
That is, despite agreeing that the plaintiff was disabled and receiving a note
from a health care provider recommending schedule alterations, the employer
was excused from granting a request to change the employee’s schedule by
thirty minutes.
Courts have also denied failure-to-accommodate claims even though
disabled employees provided medical documentation of disability on the
grounds that the documentation provided was insufficient. In Beck v.
University of Wisconsin Board of Regents,130 the Seventh Circuit blamed
Lorraine Beck for the breakdown of the interactive process.131 It rejected her
claim that the University of Wisconsin failed to reasonably accommodate her
osteoarthritis and depression despite her providing several doctor’s notes
recommending that her workload be adjusted and tailored to account for her
limitations.132
122. Id. at 487.
123. Id. at 489.
124. Id. at 488.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 492.
127. Id. (alteration in original).
128. Id.
129. Id.; see also Shivakumar v. Abbott Lab’ys, No. 99 C 7861, 2001 WL 775967, at *11
(N.D. Ill. July 10, 2001) (holding that although plaintiff identified the accommodations she
sought, she “[bore] responsibility for failure to isolate the necessary specific accommodations”
because she did not “point to an instance in which she asked for an accommodation which her
doctors recommended and was not granted”).
130. 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996).
131. See id. at 1132–33.
132. Id. In 2001, the Supreme Court held that the ADA does not permit state employees
to recover damages against state employers because Title I of the ADA did not abrogate
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Beck began working for the university in 1967.133 In 1991, she was
assigned to the Department of Health Maintenance in the School of Nursing
and began to suffer from osteoarthritis.134 In February 1992, Beck’s doctor
recommended that Beck “avoid repetitive keyboard use,” which could “quite
possibly” resolve her osteoarthritis symptoms.135 In May 1992, Beck was
hospitalized for depression and anxiety.136 When she returned to work on
June 9, 1992, her doctor wrote that “[s]he is to work one half day on Thursday
and she is to work full days thereafter. She has suffered recurrent major
depression. This is a serious medical illness and may require some
reasonable accommodation so that she does not have a recurrence of this
condition.”137
The university requested access to her medical records, but Beck refused
to sign a release.138 Following a July 1992 hospitalization, Beck returned to
work and provided the following additional information from her doctor:
Lorraine Beck has completed (9) days of hospitalization for depression and
medication readjustment. In returning to work on 8/10/92 she may require
appropriate assistance with her work load. An adjustable computer
keyboard would be helpful in preventing further difficulties with her hands.
All in all, tayloring [sic] her work load to what she & your staff feel she
can realistically accomplish, would do much to assist in her transition back
to work, and future productivity.139
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360
(2001). Garrett affected plaintiffs’ ability to recover damages against state employers. Id.
This Article cites cases brought against state employers before Garrett involving medical
documentation requirements because their logic is consistent with the medicaldocumentation-based holdings in cases involving private employers. Also, Garrett does not
bar two categories of actions against state employers: actions for money damages brought by
the United States and actions brought by private individuals seeking injunctive relief pursuant
to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9. In 2002, Judith
Olans Brown and Wendy E. Parmet identified several cases in which federal courts recognized
disabled plaintiffs’ use of Ex parte Young “to obtain prospective relief against state officials.”
Judith Olans Brown & Wendy E. Parmet, The Imperial Sovereign: Sovereign Immunity & the
ADA, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 15 & n.105 (2001) (citing, inter alia, Randolph v. Rodgers,
253 F.3d 342 (8th Cir. 2001) and Frazier v. Simmon, 254 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2001)). In
Frazier, the Tenth Circuit held that Title I claims are cognizable under Ex parte Young. 254
F.3d at 1254–55 (rejecting claims for prospective relief on grounds that the employee was not
qualified). In Randolph, the Eighth Circuit recognized a state prisoner’s Ex parte Young-based
ADA Title II claim for prospective relief based on a request that he be provided with a signlanguage interpreter. 253 F.3d at 343, 348 (dismissing claims as against some named parties
to the suit but allowing others to proceed). But see Seth A. Horvath, Note, Disentangling the
Eleventh Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Alternative Remedies for StateInitiated Disability Discrimination Under Title I and Title II, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 253
(describing the significant limitations on ADA Title I plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief,
especially with respect to reinstatement, using the example of Rizzato-Reines v. Kane County
Sheriff, 149 F. Supp. 2d 482 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
133. Beck, 75 F.3d at 1132.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1133.
138. Id.
139. Id. (alteration in original).

2021]

DISABILITY WITHOUT DOCUMENTATION

77

The assistant dean of the university’s nursing school informed Beck that,
despite her doctor’s note, he did not understand what accommodations she
needed and that Beck would work with him directly until additional
information was received.140 Beck was moved to a small office with no
windows.141 She received a wrist pad but not an adjustable keyboard.142
Following a third medical leave, Beck requested a transfer to a different
department but was denied.143 When she refused to report to her assigned
department, she was terminated.144
The court concluded that Beck obstructed the interactive process when she
failed to release her medical records, which would have provided her
employer with necessary additional information regarding exactly what
accommodations she needed.145 Only the medical records could have
“isolate[d] the necessary specific accommodations,” and because only Beck
could provide access to the medical records, the interactive process
breakdown was her fault.146 According to the court, “the University never
knew exactly what action it needed to take.”147
The court penalized Beck for failing to provide her employer with access
to her complete medical records, even though not all of her records were
likely relevant to her accommodation request. Moreover, Beck might have
had good-faith reasons to keep the entirety of her medical records from her
employer. Her physicians had presumably reviewed them and decided what
kind of relevant information needed to be shared in their notes. But Beck’s
doctor’s notes did not suffice. The court penalized Beck for withholding,
during the accommodations process, records that she would have arguably
been entitled to withhold during discovery and to move in limine to exclude
at trial.
Beck has been cited frequently by courts rejecting
failure-to-accommodate claims due to a disabled employee’s failure to
provide sufficient medical documentation of their disability and
limitations.148
In Tatum v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania,149 the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania reached a similar result. Joyce Tatum, a nurse’s
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1136.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Raleigh, 140 F. Supp. 3d 470, 485 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (citing
Beck in support of the conclusion that “medical documentation allows the employer to
determine the precise nature and extent of the employee’s restriction due to a disability under
the ADA and to assess potential reasonable accommodations”); Roberts v. Kaiser Found.
Hosp., No. 12-cv-2506, 2015 WL 545999, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2015) (citing Beck in
support of its conclusion that a disabled employee has not adequately engaged in the
interactive process when the employee’s doctor provides “proposed accommodations” but
does not discuss “plaintiff’s actual limitations”), aff’d sub nom. Roberts v. Permanente Med.
Grp., Inc., 690 F. App’x 535 (9th Cir. 2017).
149. 57 F. Supp. 2d 145 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d, 216 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 2000).
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assistant, was fired following her refusal to lift heavy patients.150 Like Beck,
she provided medical documentation of her disability—a cyst that caused her
severe pain when she lifted heavy objects151—but the documentation was
deemed insufficient.152 She alleged disability discrimination as a result of
her employer’s failure to accommodate her disability.153
Though Tatum’s responsibilities included lifting heavy patients, she was
able to perform her essential job functions from 1973 until 1995 because the
hospital provided her with lifting assistance.154 In 1994, Tatum informed her
supervisor, Elizabeth Craig, that it was difficult to lift and pull “heavy”
patients.155 Craig asked for a note, from Tatum’s gynecologist who had
treated the cyst, to verify Tatum’s assertions.156 Her gynecologist, Dr.
Parrot, wrote a note stating that “Mrs. Tatum is unable to lift or pull heavy
patients.”157 Craig asked for more information from Parrot.158 Parrot,
however, informed Tatum that “she did not need another note”159 and refused
to complete a “Physical Capabilities Form” because Tatum “could work.”160
Craig then suggested that Tatum take the form to the hospital’s
occupational health department.161 There, a nurse practitioner refused to fill
out the form.162 Craig next suggested that Tatum take the form to her family
physician, Dr. Gratz.163 She returned to Craig and explained that Gratz
would not fill out the form either.164
On March 28, 1995, Tatum reported to work and told the evening
coordinator that she could not lift heavy patients. Tatum was informed that
if she would not lift heavy patients, she should leave and would not be
paid.165 Tatum left but reported to work the following day, at which time she
was suspended for three days without pay.166 Nonetheless, she continued to
work until August 1995 when she was terminated.167
In rejecting her failure-to-accommodate claim and her suggestion that the
hospital failed to participate in the interactive process, the court criticized the
lack of information provided by Tatum:
Dr. Parrot’s cryptic note of September 21, 1994 did not describe in detail
the nature of the disability, its cause, whether the disability was permanent
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 148 (granting employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law).
Id. at 147.
Id. at 147–48.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id.
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or temporary, or what treatments plaintiff was receiving. In short, the note
did not provide sufficient information to determine whether the disability
was protected under the ADA. Furthermore, Dr. Parrot provided no details
as to the restrictions needed to accommodate plaintiff’s disability. For
example, there is no information as to the amount of weight plaintiff was
restricted from lifting. The only clarifying information provided to Ms.
Craig by plaintiff regarding Dr. Parrot’s opinion, was that Dr. Parrot
indicated that plaintiff “could work.”168

Moreover, the court characterized Craig’s repeated requests for medical
documentation as evidence of the hospital’s good-faith participation in the
interactive process. According to the court, the hospital could not discuss
what accommodations Tatum wanted because Tatum failed to provide
“necessary medical information.”169 By contrast, the court lauded the
hospital’s efforts, noting that it “gave plaintiff at least four opportunities to
produce the required information.”170 According to the court, there was
nothing more for the hospital to do, as the hospital was not required to
negotiate “with a brick wall.”171
But Tatum was not a brick wall. She provided a note from a doctor who
identified the relevant limitations: Tatum could not lift or pull heavy patients.
The hospital could have offered to provide Tatum with assistance any time
Tatum believed that a patient would be too heavy for her to lift.172
Additionally, courts have treated the failure to provide medical
documentation of disability as suggestive of fraud. In Mudra v. School City
of Hammond,173 Linda Mudra, a high school teacher with thirty years of
experience, was fired for absenteeism following her failure to report to work
while suffering from depression.174 Acting on the recommendation of her
physician Dr. Goodman, Mudra did not report to teach on August 20, 2000,
the first day of the academic year, as she “needed some time off to test the
medications [Dr. Goodman] was trying out on her to treat her depression.”175
Mudra provided written instructions for a substitute teacher and gave the
school a note from Dr. Goodman stating that she was “unable to return to
work until further notice.”176
On August 21, the school’s insurance coordinator asked Mudra for her
medical records, but “Mudra did not want to bring her records to the school
for privacy reasons.”177 On August 31, the school asked Mudra to be
168. Id. at 148–49 (footnote omitted).
169. Id. at 149.
170. Id. at 150 (quoting Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 737 (5th Cir. 1999)).
171. Id.
172. See Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination in Higher Education, 27 J. COLL. &
U.L. 417, 430 (2000) (“A different case might have been presented had the plaintiff been
unable to afford the required medical review and the employer persisted in refusing to conduct
the review itself or negotiate accommodations in the absence of the review.”).
173. No. 2:02CV260, 2004 WL 3318761 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2004).
174. Id. at *2.
175. Id. at *1.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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examined by Dr. Kemp, a doctor selected by the school, who would provide
a second opinion regarding Mudra’s illness.178 Mudra was examined by Dr.
Kemp and gave him permission to discuss his findings with Dr. Goodman
but did not give Dr. Kemp her medical records.179 Dr. Kemp concluded that
Mudra suffered from generalized anxiety disorder and hypertension.180 He
attempted, but was unable, to contact Dr. Goodman.181
On September 29, the school informed Mudra that her failure to provide
Dr. Kemp with the information he needed was “noncompliance with their
request for a second opinion” and would result in loss of compensation until
her medical condition was verified or until she reported to teach.182
On October 16, Dr. Goodman sent the school another note stating that
Mudra would not return to teach “until further notice.”183 On October 31,
the school sent Mudra a letter stating that Dr. Goodman’s notes were
“insufficient to explain her absence” and that she would not be paid unless
she verified her medical condition or reported to work.184 On November 30,
an additional doctor wrote a letter to the school on behalf of Mudra
explaining that her absence was caused by “Major Depressive Disorder,
Moderate.”185 In response, the school wrote Mudra and explained that she
would need to obtain a second opinion from a doctor selected by the
school.186 On June 4, 2001, Mudra was terminated after she refused to obtain
the second opinion.187
The court rejected Mudra’s failure-to-accommodate claim because she
“did not engage in the interactive process.”188 According to the court, the
interactive process “is supposed to aid an employer in determining the precise
limitations resulting from a disability.”189 Here, the breakdown in the
interactive process was Mudra’s responsibility. Mudra “did very little to
provide the school or its doctor with information from which they could make
a reasonable assessment of what sort of accommodation would be
necessary.”190 When the school made a “simple request for a second opinion
regarding her depression,” Mudra “complied, but only partially.”191
The court also rejected Mudra’s arguments that the medical examinations
requested by the school were barred by the ADA. The court acknowledged
statutory and regulatory language requiring that medical examinations of an

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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employee be “job-related and consistent with business necessity.”192 Still,
the court explained that “cases have held that asking for more information
regarding the nature of an illness is part of the interactive process that is part
of finding reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee.”193 The
school needed to know “the nature and extent” of Mudra’s illness to know
“who is going to be showing up to work.”194 Without the medical
documentation, Mudra and other employees would have “an easy way of
circumventing policies aimed at preventing absenteeism.”195 The court
stated that “[t]his is especially true in light of the very limited amount of
information that Mudra provided the School on her own.”196
However, the school did have information regarding Mudra’s ability to
work. Dr. Goodman explained that she would be unable to work “until
further notice” as a result of depression.197 Instead of requiring Mudra to
submit to additional examinations, the school could have requested periodic
updates regarding her ability to work. Not every disability has a clear end
date. A disability that prohibits an employee from working “until further
notice” is not necessarily a disability invented to evade work.
C. The Medical Documentation Mistake
Courts treat a doctor’s assessment of disability as “critical” to the
interactive process, finding that without it, “[a]n employer cannot be
expected to propose reasonable accommodation.”198 A system in which
doctors, but not disabled individuals themselves, are consulted to determine
whether a disability exists and how it should be accommodated embraces the
medical model of disability. In such a system, disability only exists if a
doctor has recorded its existence in medical records. Requiring medical
documentation of disability during the interactive process betrays the social
model of disability on which the ADA rests and is inconsistent with
legislative history and the EEOC’s own interactive process guidance.
This inconsistency can be traced to guidance regarding an employer’s
ability to require medical examinations and make disability-related inquiries.
That guidance has developed separate from, and without reference to,
interactive process guidance. The medical examination and inquiries
guidance endorses employer requests for medical documentation when those
requests for documentation are made in response to an employee’s

192. Id. at *6 (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A); then citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c)).
193. Id. (“The real purpose of this statute is to prevent employers from requiring
examinations of employees that they suspect of having some disability.”).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at *1.
198. See, e.g., Templeton v. Neodata Servs., Inc., 162 F.3d 617, 619 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding that “the employee’s failure to provide medical information necessary to the
interactive process precludes her from claiming that the employer violated the ADA by failing
to provide reasonable accommodation”).
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reasonable accommodation requests. As explained below, this guidance
should be disregarded.
The ADA treats medical examinations and inquiries as presumptively
prohibited disability discrimination.199 An employer cannot require a
medical examination or ask an employee whether the employee “is an
individual with a disability” or how severe the employee’s disability is unless
the examination or inquiry is “job-related and consistent with business
necessity.”200
Chai Feldblum, who played a leading role in drafting the ADA and served
as legal counsel for the disability and civil rights communities in
Washington, D.C., during the ADA’s three-year negotiations,201 has
described the ban on medical examinations and inquiries as a “key aspect[]”
of the ADA’s employment title.202 Pre-employment examinations could
facilitate disability discrimination and thus needed to be curtailed. Feldblum
explains that “Congress sought to prevent employers from using
pre-employment medical inquiries ‘to exclude applicants with disabilities—
particularly those with so-called hidden disabilities such as epilepsy,
diabetes, emotional illness, heart disease, and cancer—before their ability to
perform the job was even evaluated.’”203 For example, if an employer asked
a candidate if they were being treated for cancer, the employer might choose
to immediately rely on the cancer-related information to reject the candidate.
When a disability is “identified early in the application process,” it “taints the
remainder of the application process.”204
A current employee also should not be required to submit to medical
examinations and inquiries. As Feldblum noted, employees’ actual
performance, as opposed to information about their health, “is the best
measure of [their] ability to do the job.”205 As a result, the ADA provides
that an employee who uses increased amounts of sick leave or appears sickly,
for example, cannot be required to submit to an examination that would test
her “for AIDS, HIV infection, or cancer,” unless the “testing is job-related
and consistent with business necessity.”206
Relevant regulations repeat the ADA’s requirement that medical
examinations and inquiries of current employees must be job-related and
consistent with business necessity.207 The regulations also contemplate how
the information acquired through permitted examinations and inquiries may
199. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A), (d)(4)(A).
200. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
201. Chai Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: A View from the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 521 n.* (1991).
202. Id. at 531.
203. Harrison v. Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 1).
204. Feldblum, supra note 201, at 532.
205. Id. at 538.
206. Id. at 539 n.107 (quoting Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with
Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,750 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 1630
(2020)) (interpretive guidance related to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13)).
207. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) (2020).
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be used, explaining that “[s]upervisors and managers may be informed
regarding necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the employee and
necessary accommodations.”208 They do not otherwise link medical
examinations and inquiries to the interactive process.
EEOC guidance goes further. It identifies three circumstances in which
medical examinations and inquiries of employed individuals are
“[s]pecifically [p]ermitted.”209
First, “fitness for duty exams” are
permissible “when there is a need to determine whether an employee is still
able to perform the essential functions of his or her job.”210 Second,
employers may require “periodic physicals to determine fitness for duty or
other medical monitoring if such physicals or monitoring are required by
medical standards or requirements established by Federal, State, or local law
that are consistent with the ADA.”211 Third, employers may “make inquiries
or require medical examinations necessary to the reasonable accommodation
process described in” the regulations implementing the ADA.212 Yet the
“reasonable accommodation process” is the interactive process, which has its
own specific guidance and does not mention examinations and inquiries.213
Guidance that allows employers to require employees to undergo medical
examinations or answer medical inquiries regarding disability is inconsistent
with the informal vision of the interactive process.
Nevertheless, in 2000, the EEOC provided additional guidance regarding
disability-related inquiries and medical examinations and again justified
injecting them into the interactive process.214 Inquiries and examinations
that “follow up on a request for reasonable accommodation when the
disability or need for accommodation is not known or obvious” may be
“job-related and consistent with business necessity.”215 It specified exactly
when the request would satisfy the standard: “when the disability or the need
for the accommodation is not known or obvious.”216 In that case, an
employer can ask the employee for “reasonable documentation about [the]
disability and its functional limitations that require reasonable
accommodation.”217
As a result of this guidance, medical documentation requests will almost
always be job-related and consistent with business necessity. Disability is
not well understood. Whether disabilities are visible, invisible, common, or
rare will depend on an employer’s own subjective understanding of
disability. An employer who has never experienced disability will likely treat
208. Id. § 1630.14(c)(1)(i).
209. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., § 1630.14 (2020).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2020); supra Part II.A.
214. Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of
Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), EEOC Notice No. 915.002
(July 27, 2000), 2000 WL 33407181 [hereinafter “Enforcement Guidance”].
215. Id. at *6.
216. Id. at *9 (emphasis omitted).
217. Id.
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most disabilities as unknown and therefore in need of documentation. Very
few, if any, will be considered obvious.218 Thus, the guidance opens the door
to an interactive process in which requests for medical documentation are the
norm.
The guidance also encourages employers and courts to be suspicious about
an employee’s assertions that they are disabled. The guidance permits
medical documentation requests because an employer “is entitled to know
that an employee has a covered disability that requires a reasonable
accommodation.”219 That is, employees’ accounts of their disabilities are
never enough.
The EEOC’s guidance sets demanding standards for the documentation
that an employee must provide. The documentation must describe “the
nature, severity, and duration of the employee’s impairment, the activity or
activities that the impairment limits, and the extent to which the impairment
limits the employee’s ability to perform the activity or activities” and
substantiate “why the requested reasonable accommodation is needed.”220
Requiring such detailed documentation converts the interactive process into
a complicated and adversarial negotiation that is more akin to the discovery
phase of litigation than an informal process intended to result in an
accommodation that each party endorses.
The guidance has shaped reasonable accommodation decisions. Courts
have relied on it to conclude that employees who fail to provide medical
documentation to support reasonable accommodation requests have caused
the interactive process to fail and cannot claim that their employers failed to
accommodate them.221 The guidance has been relied on to justify requests
218. Courts acknowledge that “[a]n individual seeking accommodation need not provide
medical evidence of her condition in every case,” including cases in which the disability is
obvious. Ward v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 24, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014). However, courts generally
identify only one example of obvious disabilities: those involving wheelchair users. See, e.g.,
id.; J.H. ex rel. J.P. v. Bernalillo County, No. CIV 12-0128, 2014 WL 3421037, at *113
(D.N.M. July 8, 2014) (characterizing a paraplegic wheelchair user’s disability as “obvious”),
aff’d, 806 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2015); Sabal Palm Condos. of Pine Island Ridge Ass’n. v.
Fischer, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (describing the obviously disabled person
as “someone confined to a wheelchair”). Unless an individual uses a wheelchair, and the
accommodation relates to the wheelchair, disabilities will likely require documentation. See
Ward, 762 F.3d at 31 (stating that “an employer needs information about the nature of the
individual’s disability and the desired accommodation—information typically possessed only
by the individual or her physician”). Indeed, in light of the discretion the interpretive guidance
gives employers who seek medical documentation and assumptions that people with
disabilities are faking their disabilities, even individuals who use wheelchairs might be
required to prove their disabilities.
219. Enforcement Guidance, supra note 214, at *9.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Hoskins v. GE Aviation, No. 17-CV-224, 2019 WL 1339246, at *7 (N.D.
Miss. Mar. 25, 2019) (citing Enforcement Guidance, supra note 214, at *10); Turcotte v.
Comcast Cable Commc’ns Mgmt., LLC, No. 17-cv-150, 2019 WL 635409, at *13 (D.N.H.
Feb. 14, 2019) (citing Enforcement Guidance, supra note 214, at *9), appeal dismissed, No.
19-1438, 2019 WL 5598352 (1st Cir. July 3, 2019); Tavares v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. of R.I.,
C.A. No. 13-521, 2016 WL 7468130, at *18 (D.R.I. June 16, 2016) (citing Enforcement
Guidance, supra note 214, at *9), report and recommendation adopted, C.A. No. 13-521, 2016
WL 6988812 (D.R.I. Nov. 29, 2016); Heit v. Aerotek Inc., No. C15-1805, 2016 WL 6298771,
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for medical documentation establishing that an employee is disabled, as well
as requests for doctors’ notes identifying which accommodations, if any,
must be provided.222 One court characterized disabled employees who do
not provide medical documentation during the interactive process as
unreasonable.223
The guidance has also led employers to draft policies and forms which
treat medical documentation as a mandatory prerequisite to any kind of
reasonable accommodation. The University of California, which employs
the largest proportion of the state’s workforce,224 illustrates this trend.
The University of California has drafted a policy and procedures
governing the interactive process.225 The relevant policy provides that
“[w]hen the University requests that the employee provide documentation
from the employee’s health care provider to confirm that the employee has a
disability and to identify the employee’s functional limitations, the employee
has an obligation to promptly comply with such requests.”226 Moreover, the
University of California may determine that the information provided by an
at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 27, 2016) (citing Enforcement Guidance, supra note 214, at *9, *11);
Delaval v. PTech Drilling Tubulars, L.L.C., 824 F.3d 476, 482 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 214, at *10); Ali v. McCarthy, 179 F. Supp. 3d 54, 79
(D.D.C. 2016) (citing Enforcement Guidance, supra note 214, at *10–11); Allen v. City of
Raleigh, 140 F. Supp. 3d 470, 485–86 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (citing Enforcement Guidance, supra
note 214, at *10).
222. See, e.g., Neal v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., No. 08-CV-92, 2009 WL 799644, at *8
(D. Or. Mar. 23, 2009) (finding that medical recommendations provided by employee “limited
Plaintiff to working eight hours per day due to ‘sciatica’ and a ‘lower back condition’” but
“did not set out specific reasons why either of those diagnoses prohibited Plaintiff from
working more than eight hours per day” and, therefore, “Defendant required Plaintiff to
undergo an IME as permitted under the ADA in an attempt to facilitate the accommodation
and interactive process”), aff’d on other grounds, 379 F. App’x 632 (9th Cir. 2010); id. (“The
ADA ‘permits employers . . . to make inquiries or require medical examinations necessary to
the reasonable accommodation process.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630,
app., § 1630.14(c))); McCoy v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 739, 754 (M.D. Fla.
2007) (stating that “[a]n employer may require a medical examination in order to ascertain
reasonable accommodations” (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., § 1630.14(c))); Kennedy v.
Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 656 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that the ADA “permits
employers . . . to make inquiries or require medical examinations necessary to the reasonable
accommodation process” (alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app.,
§ 1630.14(c))).
223. Mynatt v. Morrison Mgt. Specialist, Inc., No. 12-CV-303, 2014 WL 619601, at *14
(E.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 2014) (“Defendant requested substantiating medical information, and
plaintiff did not provide it. By not submitting the requested information, plaintiff did not
participate in the interactive process in good faith, and thus impeded that interactive process.
A reasonable employee would have obtained the medical documentation, continued to discuss
options, and allowed the interactive process to proceed.”); see also Gardner v. W. Kentucky
Univ., No. 11-cv-79, 2015 WL 5299451, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 9, 2015), aff’d, No. 15-6121
(6th Cir. July 5, 2016) (rejecting employee’s contention “that the defendants violated the ADA
by requiring medical proof of her need for accommodations”).
224. Rachel Gillett, The Largest Employers in Each U.S. State, BUS. INSIDER (June 11,
2017, 1:31 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/largest-employers-each-us-state-2017-6
[http://perma.cc/C7Z2-PWZF].
225. See UNIV. OF CAL., POLICY PPSM-81: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION § I (2018),
https://policy.ucop.edu/doc/4010420/PPSM-81 [https://perma.cc/UA3Z-ZEZ4].
226. Id.
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employee is insufficient; if confirmation is necessary, “the University may
require that the employee be examined by a University-appointed licensed
healthcare provider.”227
Publicly available human resources material and forms indicate that the
University of California treats medical documentation of disability as a
mandatory part of the interactive process. The University of California
Office of the President, for example, has created a chart identifying “[t]he
employee’s role” in the reasonable accommodation process.228 An employee
must “[r]equest job accommodation.”229 Under a column labeled “How to
do it,” the chart states that an employee must “[p]rovide Accommodation and
Leave Services with a written licensed healthcare provider’s statement
describing your job-related limitations.”230 The health care provider, not the
employee, “will identify if limitations are temporary or permanent.”231
At UC Santa Barbara, the “Process to Request Workplace
Accommodations” requires an employee to “have their medical provider fill
out The Medical Response for a Reasonable Accommodation Request
form.”232 The interactive process does not commence until the “supporting
medical information” has been received.233 The Medical Response form
requires a “Physician” or “Medical Provider” to determine whether the
employee has a disability; identify the disability’s duration; identify “specific
work restrictions and/or functional limitations” and how long the restrictions
will “be in place”; and list the job functions the employee is “having trouble
performing because of the limitation(s).”234 Finally, it asks the individual
completing the form if they have “any suggestions as to possible
accommodation(s).”235
At UC Davis, managers and supervisors track reasonable accommodations
that are made for employees on forms that require them to identify the
medical documentation the employees have submitted from their
physicians.236 At UCLA, employees seeking reasonable accommodations
227. Id.
228. See UCOP Human Resources, OP Life, Reasonable Accommodation, The Employee’s
Role, UNIV. OF CAL. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, https://www.ucop.edu/local-humanresources/op-life/leaves-of-absence/reasonable-accommodation-employee-role.html
[https://perma.cc/5JSY-MKPU] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Workplace Accommodations: Employee Services, UNIV. OF CAL., SANTA
BARBARA HUM. RES., https://www.hr.ucsb.edu/hr-units/employee-services/workplaceaccommodations [http://perma.cc/ZYM3-RHSU] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
233. Id.
234. See Medical Response for a Reasonable Accommodation Request Form, UNIV. OF
CAL., SANTA BARBARA HUM. RES., https://www.hr.ucsb.edu/sites/default/files/
docs/Medical%20Response%20for%20Reasonable%20Accommodation.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2QB4-BMV8] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (typeface altered).
235. Id.
236. See Permanent Accommodation, UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS, https://ucdavis.app.box.com/
s/f5tdpsyqrgf9basal3tbsr98s0ojspkn [http://perma.cc/T5AW-L9D4] (last visited Aug. 9,
2021); Temporary Accommodation, UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS, https://ucdavis.app.box.com/
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must complete a form which instructs them to “attach any current medical
documentation that describes [their] functional limitations.”237 The form
makes clear that the documentation “will be requested as part of the
interactive process,” even if it is not available at the time the employee
submits the form.238
At UC Santa Cruz, medical documentation is mandatory.239 An employee
“must complete a medical release form” to permit UC Santa Cruz’s
“Disability Management Coordinator” to communicate with the employee’s
healthcare provider.240 Moreover, UC Santa Cruz may question the
documentation itself and require that “a University-appointed licensed health
care provider” verify its accuracy.241
UC Santa Cruz has set up a multistep reasonable accommodations process.
It requires the participation of a licensed health care provider and the
execution of a medical release form. And, UC Santa Cruz may reject what
the employee provides. The university permits its own health care provider
to “verify” whatever the employee provides.
As described, UC Santa Cruz’s reasonable accommodations process is
time-consuming. By contrast, the University of California’s religious
accommodations process is a breeze. To request a religious accommodation
from flu vaccine mandates, University of California employees must identify
their “sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance” that informs
their accommodation request and explain how the belief, practice or
observance “conflicts with the University’s flu vaccine mandate.”242 No
documentation is required. No expert must vouch for the employees’
representations. No university-affiliated expert can challenge what the
employees represent.
Injecting medical documentation into the interactive process has a
tremendous impact at the University of California and beyond. To obtain a
reasonable accommodation, disabled employees must have access to a
medical provider—often a doctor—who can verify and document their
disabilities. Medical providers may be asked to describe an employee’s
disability, to suggest accommodations and their duration, or both. Not all
s/2949v02huhx6qkjyndy45csh0za7i0gj [http://perma.cc/HK6P-MD7Y] (last visited Aug. 9,
2021).
237. See Request for Reasonable Accommodation, UNIV. OF CAL., L.A. INS. & RISK MGMT.,
https://ucla.app.box.com/v/reasonable-accomm-request-form [https://perma.cc/F6RF-B4EL]
(last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (typeface altered).
238. Id. (typeface altered).
239. Staff Human Resources: Reasonable Accommodation, UNIV. OF CAL., SANTA CRUZ,
https://shr.ucsc.edu/procedures/reasonable_accomodation/index.html
[http://perma.cc/3WGU-G82T] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (“Medical documentation from a
licensed health care provider must be provided by the employee to assist in understanding the
nature of the employee’s functional limitations.”).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Employee Religious Accommodation Request Form (Accommodation to Flu Vaccine
Mandate), UNIV. OF CAL., https://hr.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/employee_religious_
accommodation_request_form_for_flu_vaccine_mandate_berkeley.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5C3G-CTEG] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
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medical providers are familiar with their patients’ workplaces or their
patients’ work. When the doctors make accommodations suggestions, they
may guess the type of accommodations that would be best suited to their
patients’ needs or provide incomplete or vague recommendations that
employers need not follow.
Individuals with disabilities are so sidelined that they may be prohibited
from transmitting medical documentation of disability to their employers
directly. For instance, UC Santa Barbara requires health care providers to
send medical documentation of disability directly to the university,243 as
though employees cannot be trusted to deliver their own medical records
without altering them.
Medical documentation requirements endorsed by the guidance may make
reasonable accommodations impossible for some employees to obtain, and
there is no guidance for employees who lack health insurance. Similarly,
there is no guidance for employees whose physicians either have no idea
whether an employee is disabled for purposes of the ADA or cannot
determine the kind of accommodations that would be most appropriate in a
particular workplace. The guidance also offers no solution for employees
whose physicians refuse to complete a form documenting disability or
suggesting accommodations or who charge fees that employees cannot pay.
These are foreseeable obstacles, yet the guidance does not address them.
This Article’s recommendation to disregard guidance endorsing medical
documentation requirements is not a lofty policy goal. Rather, it is rooted in
fundamental principles governing agency action.
EEOC interpretive guidance does not receive “full Chevron deference”244
but may instead be entitled to less deferential respect,245 as established in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.246 Agency guidance documents generally reflect “a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance.”247 However, agency guidance is not entitled
to even Skidmore deference248 when it contradicts congressional intent249 or

243. UNIV. OF CAL., SANTA BARBARA HUM. RES., supra note 234.
244. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
“directs courts to accept an agency’s reasonable resolution of an ambiguity in a statute that
the agency administers.” Michigan v. E.P.A., 576 U.S. 743, 751 (2015).
245. Richardson v. Chi. Transit Auth., 926 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed.
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008)). But see Flake, supra note 41, at 78–
79 (concluding that the EEOC’s interactive process guidance is consistent with the ADA’s
legislative history and is therefore entitled to Chevron deference).
246. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
247. Richardson, 926 F.3d at 889 (quoting Fed. Express Corp., 552 U.S. at 399).
248. Kent Barnett et al., Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463,
1526 n.11 (2018) (defining “Skidmore deference” as a review in which “the courts retain
interpretive primacy” but “defer to an agency’s interpretation based on several factors,
including the thoroughness of the agency’s interpretation and its consistency with the agency’s
prior pronouncements”).
249. See, e.g., Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1221–22 (N.D. Ala. 2016),
aff’d, 707 F. App’x 641 (11th Cir. 2017); Bull v. United States, 479 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
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“a regulation’s plain language.”250 Agency guidance that is internally
inconsistent also carries little weight.251
The EEOC’s medical examination and inquiries guidance, which permits
employers to require that employees provide extensive and detailed medical
documentation in connection with a reasonable accommodations request,
should be disregarded for two reasons. First, it contradicts the ADA’s clear
legislative intent. The ADA’s drafters described an interactive process that
relied on an employee’s expertise and accommodations preferences, not the
expertise of a health care provider’s recommendations. If the employer and
employee cannot settle on an acceptable accommodation, then the legislative
history suggests the employer consult with “various employment agencies
familiar with the needs of disabled workers.”252 Moreover, the guidance’s
resort to medicine and medical records betrays the ADA’s rejection of the
medical model of disability.
Second, the medical documentation guidance is inconsistent with the
agency’s own interactive process guidance. Like relevant legislative history,
interactive process guidance instructs employers to consider the employee’s
own accommodations preferences. If additional assistance is needed, then
technical expertise should be sought from the EEOC itself, “[s]tate or local
rehabilitation agencies, or from disability constituent organizations.”253
Interactive process guidance makes no reference to medical
documentation.254
Thus, to the extent the EEOC’s guidance surrounding medical
examinations and inquiries conditions the receipt of reasonable
accommodations on medical documentation of disability or a health care
provider’s recommendations regarding which accommodations are
necessary, courts and employers should disregard the guidance.
II. ACCOMMODATION WITHOUT DOCUMENTATION
This part first explores how existing scholarship characterizes the
interactive process as a positive exchange of information between employees
and employers. Yet, in practice, medical documentation requirements strip
the interactive process of its original collaborative purpose. This part next
turns to religious accommodations, focusing on how employers and courts
do not meaningfully question an employee’s assertion that they hold certain
religious beliefs. It considers a similar hands-off approach to employees’
assertions that they are disabled. It envisions reasonable accommodations
that defer to employees’ understandings of their own disabilities and
identities and the accommodations the employees recommend.
250. Springfield Parcel C, LLC v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 163, 184 (2015).
251. See Jones, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 1221–22.
252. Mayerson, supra note 21, at 516.
253. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., § 1630.9 (2020) (describing the “Process of Determining
the Appropriate Reasonable Accommodation”).
254. See id. The related “Reasonable Accommodation Process Illustrated” also makes no
mention of medical documentation. See id.
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A. Accommodation Theory
Scholars generally praise the interactive process, treating it as one that
facilitates collaboration and leads to reasonable accommodations suitable to
both employers and employees.255 Dallan Flake’s study of how the ADA’s
interactive reasonable accommodations process differs from Title VII’s
religious accommodations framework is instructive.256
Flake argues that the interactive process allows for more significant
employee involvement257 and also permits employers and employees to
“work together in good faith.”258 When an employee participates
meaningfully in the accommodations process, he explains, it is more likely
that the employee will receive “a suitable accommodation.”259 The
interactive process allows the employee to “discuss with the employer his
precise job limitations and also suggest potential accommodations the
employer may not have otherwise considered.”260 Therefore, even when an
accommodation is denied on the basis of being unreasonable, “the interactive
process can provide the employee with greater confidence that the
employer’s decision was justified because the employer properly solicited
and considered the employee’s input.”261 That is, the interactive process’s
inherent fairness can soften the blow of an accommodations denial.262
Flake describes how employers benefit from the interactive process.
Employers and employees share responsibility for the ultimate
accommodation decided.263 Flake contends that, as a result, the interactive
process will either decrease the risk of litigation or better position an
employer, who has participated in good faith, to prevail.264 Flake goes as far
255. See, e.g., Stacy A. Hickox & Angela Hall, Atypical Accommodations for Employees
with Psychiatric Disabilities, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 537, 573–75 (2018); Susan D. Carle, Analyzing
Social Impairments Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1109, 1142 (2017); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination,
and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 4–5 (1996). Elsewhere, Hickox has taken
a more critical approach, noting that the interactive process requires employees to reveal
otherwise hidden psychiatric disabilities. See Hickox & Case, supra note 77, at 573. The fear
of stigma and stereotypes may deter employees with psychiatric disabilities from seeking
reasonable accommodations, depriving them of the adjustments that would render their
workplaces accessible. Id. at 536–37 (“[M]any employees and applicants with disabilities are
still reluctant to reveal their disability, even if it means foregoing their right to reasonable
accommodations.”). Hickox and Case conclude that courts have endorsed arguably overbroad
requests for medical documentation of employees’ disabilities and suggest mitigating
measures, including prohibiting employers from seeking employees’ entire medical records.
Id. at 588. They do not, however, question the validity of medical record requests.
256. Flake, supra note 41.
257. Id. at 69–70.
258. Id. at 69.
259. Id. at 70.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Though not central to Flake’s thesis, this conclusion does not consider that employees
may be terminated if they cannot perform a job’s essential function without accommodation.
Terminated employees will not find comfort in knowing that the interactive process solicited
their input.
263. Flake, supra note 41, at 70.
264. Id.
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as suggesting that the interactive process “can boost employee morale, and
in turn, productivity.”265 Flake concludes that religious accommodations
should also involve an interactive process.266
Flake’s survey of interactive process cases includes those that require
employees to submit medical information or documentation requested by an
employer.267 He explains that courts have held that “the employee has a duty
to cooperate with the employer throughout the interactive process,” and that
when employees fail to do so, their accommodation claims are dismissed.268
Flake describes the holding in Ali v. McCarthy,269 in which an employer
failed to accommodate environmental allergies because the employee failed
to provide medical documentation beyond a “six-year-old doctor’s note” and
a “copy of a prescription he previously submitted.”270 In Ali, Flake writes,
the employer’s request for additional information “was highly reasonable and
[the court found] that it was Ali who abandoned the interactive process by
refusing to cooperate.”271 Flake also explains that courts fault employees for
“break[ing] off the interactive process prematurely.”272
Flake identifies Ward v. McDonald273 as an example of a case in which
the employee was responsible for the early failure of the interactive
process.274 In Ward, the employee failed to provide her employer with
precise information from her doctors regarding “what accommodation she
needed and whether she could even perform the essential functions of her
job.”275
Flake’s account of the interactive process’s origins is detailed and
instructive. He describes relevant legislative history and regulations, as well
as courts’ uniform requirement that employers and employees engage in the
interactive process. I appreciate, and indeed rely on, Flake’s account of the
interactive process’s legislative and regulatory history. However, whereas
Flake assumes that the interactive process functions as intended, I conclude
that, in practice, the interactive process is a failure, and I take a critical
approach to cases like Ali and Ward.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 71. Flake has drawn additional thoughtful connections between religious
accommodations and disability accommodations, arguing, for example, that those who
experience discrimination because they are regarded as holding certain religious beliefs should
receive the same protection as the ADA affords those who experience discrimination because
they are mistakenly perceived as being disabled. Dallan F. Flake, Religious Discrimination
Based on Employer Misperception, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 87, 89–90. Religious discrimination
and disability discrimination are both “intentional and harmful”; therefore,
misperception-based discrimination, whether rooted in religion or disability, should always be
prohibited. Id. at 108.
267. See Flake, supra note 41, at 96–97.
268. Id. at 96.
269. 179 F. Supp. 3d 54 (D.D.C. 2016).
270. See Flake, supra note 41, at 97 (citing Ali, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 68–69).
271. Id. at 97.
272. Id. at 98.
273. 762 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
274. See Flake, supra note 41, at 96–97.
275. Id. (citing Ward, 762 F.3d at 33).
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This Article highlights how the interactive process is in fact not guided by
an employee’s own understanding of which accommodations are best.
Rather, disability only exists if a medical provider, most often a doctor, says
it does. A doctor, not an employee, must suggest the appropriate
accommodation. Rather than empowering, the interactive process is
exhausting.
As explained herein, the interactive process imposed on disabled
employees is burdensome and betrays the ADA’s purpose. The interactive
process must be fixed before it is applied in another context. However, there
are meaningful connections to be drawn between disability accommodations
and religious accommodations.
As explained below, the religious
accommodations process accepts an employee’s stated reason as to why an
accommodation is necessary. Disability, of course, is questioned. Perhaps
it, too, should be subject to a deferential hands-off approach.
B. The Hands-Off Approach to Religious Beliefs
In 1972, Title VII was amended to require employers to accommodate
their employees’ sincerely held religious beliefs, including all aspects of
employees’ religious observances and practices, so long as the
accommodations would not cause the employers undue hardship.276 The
amendment responded to employers’ refusals to hire or accommodate
employees whose religious practices required them to abstain from working
on certain days.277 It was intended to give employees in the private sphere
the same rights the Constitution affords federal, state, and local employees,
reaching both beliefs and religious observances, including those that involve
missing work.278 As a result, Title VII protection extends to beliefs that
require “missing work for Good Friday services and the Sabbath, wearing a
Muslim headscarf or Hindu bindi, requesting excused absences for religious
prayer based on atheism or for observance of the Wiccan New Year, and
attending a Native American ritual ceremony.”279

276. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (defining religion to include “all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable
to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance
or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business”); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employment discrimination); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (stating that “[t]he intent and effect of this definition was to
make it an unlawful employment practice under [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)] for an employer
not to make reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, for the religious practices
of his employees and prospective employees”).
277. See Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 362–64 (1997).
278. Id. at 369–71.
279. Kimberly D. Phillips, Promulgating Conscience: Drafting Pharmacist Conscientious
Objector Clauses That Balance a Pharmacist’s Moral Right to Refuse to Dispense Medication
with Non-Beneficiaries’ Economic and Legal Rights, 15 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 227, 247
(2011).
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Between 1972 and 1980, courts and employers “often questioned the
sincerity or validity of employees’ claimed beliefs.”280 Courts relied on Free
Exercise Clause cases, following either Wisconsin v. Yoder’s281 willingness
to recognize institutional religion but not personal preference, or United
States v. Seeger282 and Welsh v. United States,283 which recognized not only
beliefs sanctioned by organized religion but also “sincerely held beliefs that
are religious in one’s own ‘scheme of things.’”284 The interpretive
differences reflected a tension between courts that treated religious beliefs as
compelled and immutable, dictated by institutions, and those that instead
accepted that religious beliefs could be idiosyncratic and personal.285 The
former did not extend Title VII protection to personal religious preferences,
while the latter did, through a hands-off approach.286
The EEOC revised its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion
in 1980.287 The revisions were made “in response to public confusion
concerning the duty of employers and labor organizations to reasonably
accommodate the religious practices of employees and prospective
employees,”288 and the guidelines endorsed the hands-off approach.289
Current agency guidance instructs employers that they “should ordinarily
assume that an employee’s request for religious accommodation is based on
a sincerely held religious belief.”290 Employees’ representations regarding
their religious beliefs and practices should be believed, the EEOC has
explained, because “the employer may be unfamiliar” with the beliefs.291
Indeed, beliefs may still be sincerely held religious beliefs even if “no
religious group espouses such beliefs” or “the religious group to which the
individual professes to belong may not accept such belief.”292

280. Engle, supra note 277, at 361. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Hardison
defined undue hardship as “any burden on the employer that is ‘more than de minimis.’” Id.
at 372 (quoting Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84). This Article focuses on how employers and courts
examine the status and identity that give rise to accommodation requests based on religion and
disability. A discussion of the difference between employers’ burden-based defenses to
accommodation requests is beyond its scope.
281. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
282. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
283. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
284. Engle, supra note 277, at 373 (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185 and Welsh, 398 U.S.
at 339).
285. Id. at 373–74.
286. Id.
287. See Engle, supra note 277, at 385; see also Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Religion, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,610, 72,610 (Oct. 31, 1980) (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1605.1 (2020)).
288. Engle, supra note 277, at 385.
289. Id. at 362.
290. Compliance Manual on Religious Discrimination: EEOC Directives Transmittal No.
915.063 (Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter “EEOC Compliance Manual”], http://www.eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/religion.html [http://perma.cc/8BHW-HL66].
291. Id.
292. Drew D. Hintze, Mandatory Influenza Vaccination Policies in Colorado: Are
Healthcare Employees with Religious Conflicts Exempt?, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 38
(2013) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1).
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Whether an employee’s religious belief is “sincere” is rarely in dispute.293
Certain factors might, however, undermine an assertion that a belief is
sincerely held. For example, sincerity might be called into question when:
an employee “has behaved in a manner markedly inconsistent with the
professed belief,” “the accommodation sought is a particularly desirable
benefit that is likely to be sought for secular reasons,” and when “the timing
of the request renders it suspect (e.g., it follows an earlier request by the
employee for the same benefit for secular reasons).”294
Still, the EEOC cautions that if an employee’s practice deviates from a
religion’s commonly followed tenets, that alone is not grounds to doubt the
sincerity of the employee’s beliefs.295 Also, because religious beliefs may
change over time, “newly adopted or inconsistently observed religious
practice may nevertheless be sincerely held.”296 An employer may seek to
verify an employee’s stated beliefs, but the inquiry is only permitted “[w]here
the accommodation request itself does not provide enough information to
enable the employer to make a determination, and the employer has a bona
fide doubt as to the basis for the accommodation request.”297 Further, such
inquiry must be “limited.”298
The EEOC provides a case-based example of circumstances that would
justify a request for additional information:
Bob, who had been a dues-paying member of [a union] for fourteen years,
had a work-related dispute with a union official and one week later asserted
that union activities were contrary to his religion and that he could no
longer pay union dues. The union doubted whether Bob’s request was
based on a sincerely held religious belief, given that it appeared to be
precipitated by an unrelated dispute with the union, and he had not sought
this accommodation in his prior fourteen years of employment.299

Under those circumstances, the union could require Bob “to provide
additional information to support his assertion that he sincerely holds a
religious conviction that precludes him from belonging to—or financially
supporting—a union.”300
Employees should provide information to resolve employers’ reasonable
doubts.301 But the information need not be presented in a particular form,
and an employee’s own “first-hand explanation” may alleviate the
employer’s doubts.302 “[E]ven when third-party verification is requested, it
does not have to come from a clergy member or fellow congregant, but rather
293. See EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 290.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. (citing Bushouse v. Local Union 2209, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1078 & n.18 (N.D. Ind. 2001)).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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could be provided by others who are aware of the employee’s religious
practice or belief.”303
As Zachary Kramer has explained, “religious discrimination law embraces
an attitude of liberal neutrality toward the particulars of a person’s
religion.”304 Just as the EEOC encourages employers to believe an
employee’s representation that the employee holds a particular religious
belief, courts resolving religious discrimination claims are also “reluctant to
scrutinize an individual’s religious beliefs.”305 Outside of the employment
context, the U.S. Supreme Court also follows the hands-off approach,
“deferring to adherents’ characterizations of the substance and significance
of a religious practice or belief.”306
In addition to respecting the intimate nature of an employee’s religious
practice, the hands-off approach to religious beliefs also simplifies the
accommodations process. It is a practical model.
C. The Hands-Off Approach to Disability
This Article proposes borrowing only one aspect of the religious
accommodations analysis: the hands-off approach to employees’ assertions
that they hold certain religious beliefs.307 The approach contends that
employees’ representations regarding their disabilities should be treated the
same way.
The justifications underlying the hands-off approach to religious beliefs
also apply to disability. Just like religion, an employer may be unfamiliar
with disability. In the context of religion, the hands-off approach instructs
that beliefs that are not held by an identifiable religious group still enjoy legal
protection. An employer may only have knowledge of disabilities that are
visible, familiar, or experienced by an identifiable segment of the population.
If an employee experiences disability in a way that the employer has never
303. Id.
304. Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 897 (2014).
305. Bushouse, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
306. Samuel J. Levine, A Critique of Hobby Lobby and the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off
Approach to Religion, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 26, 26–27 (2015). However, the Court
is not equally protective of all religions. See, e.g., Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v.
Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 80 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (comparing the Court’s
application of strict scrutiny to pandemic-related restrictions on Catholic and Jewish houses
of worship to its refusal to apply strict scrutiny to “a Presidential Proclamation limiting
immigration from Muslim-majority countries, even though President Trump had described the
Proclamation as a ‘Muslim Ban’”); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2439, 2433 (2018)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (comparing the Court’s treatment of perceived hostility directed at
a baker’s Christianity to its decision to “leave[] undisturbed a policy first advertised openly
and unequivocally as a ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States’”).
307. It does not propose incorporating the definition of “undue hardship” in religious
accommodations contexts. An employer need not provide a religious accommodation nor a
disability accommodation that causes an undue hardship. See Nicole Buonocore Porter,
Accommodating Everyone, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 85, 89 (2016). However, under the ADA,
undue hardship “is defined as ‘significant difficulty or expense,’” whereas “in the religious
discrimination context . . . the Supreme Court defined it to mean anything more than a ‘de
minimis cost.’” Id.
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seen before, the employer’s lack of knowledge should not trigger a
documentation requirement.
Of course, there are differences between disability and religion. The free
exercise of religion is a fundamental right expressly protected by the First
Amendment.308 Disability discrimination by state actors only triggers
rational basis review.309 However, Title VII reaches discrimination in
private employment, using the Commerce Clause to go beyond state
action.310 In that context, religious exercise and accommodations for
religious practice lose their constitutional dimension. Therefore, borrowing
one aspect of religious accommodations law does not transplant heightened
scrutiny to disability discrimination. Rather, it applies a reasonable fix to a
process in disarray. Adopting the hands-off model currently applied to
religious accommodations would result in an interactive process that
proceeds based on employees’ own descriptions of their disabilities. “I have
diabetes” would suffice. Employees would not need doctor’s notes or
medical records to support their own assertions that they have diabetes.
This would streamline and accelerate the interactive process. First, it
would eliminate time spent on collecting and reviewing medical records. It
would also avoid the expense created by medical documentation requests.
Freeing reasonable accommodations from documentation requirements
might also increase productivity. Employees would no longer miss work to
obtain medical documentation.
The fear that people are faking their disabilities influences the legal rules
surrounding disability, creating systems in which individuals who seek legal
protection must go to great lengths to demonstrate that they are worthy of
it.311 A system that requires extensive medical documentation may eliminate
applicants who cannot obtain the documentation for a myriad of practical
reasons that bear no relation to disability.312 If reasonable accommodations
return to their informal roots, more employees with disabilities might be
inclined to seek them out. An interactive process that proceeds without
medical documentation defers to employees’ experiences. Accepting
employees’ description of their own disabilities would convert the interactive
process from one controlled by suspicion into one steeped in trust.
To the extent that false claims of disability must be addressed, religious
accommodations offer a solution that is also superior to the current disability
practice. The EEOC instructs that an employee’s assertion that religious
308. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
309. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (stating that “States
are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the
disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational”).
310. Ioanna Tourkochoriti, Revisiting Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC: The Road Not Taken, 49
TULSA L. REV. 47, 82 (2013).
311. See generally Dorfman, supra note 3.
312. See Rabia Belt & Doron Dorfman, Reweighing Medical Civil Rights, 72 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 176, 179, 183–85 (2020) (describing the cost of medicalizing civil rights and
explaining how “medical status acts as a gatekeeper to narrow the number of people who can
utilize benefits and rights”).
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beliefs are sincerely held should generally be accepted. That is, the default
is acceptance. Disability should be treated the same way.
However, there are circumstances in which an employer is entitled to ask
for some documentation to support a religious accommodations request. For
example, when the timing of a request renders it suspect, an employer can
ask for documentation to show that a religious belief is in fact sincere and
that a related practice must be accommodated. Still, the employer’s doubt
has to be bona fide. In the disability context, a request for documentation
might be reasonable when an employee first asks for time off for vacation, is
denied, and then repeats the request through the reasonable accommodations
process, claiming that the time off is needed as a result of a disability. The
timing of such a request, not the disability itself, creates the need to
investigate.
Even when employers may ask for documentation of an individual’s
religious belief, the documentation need not take any particular form. In the
religious accommodations context, an employer should consider an
employee’s firsthand explanation regarding the employee’s beliefs. To the
extent third-party input is required, it need not come from a church official
or church member. In the disability context, an employee’s own detailed
explanation of their disability should also suffice to relieve bona fide
concerns. Others familiar with the employee’s disability may also be called
on to explain their understanding of the employee’s disability. Expertise
need not come from health care providers.
Finally, employees must be able to suggest their own accommodations.
Legislative intent is clear that disabled employees’ suggestions should be
prioritized, as they reflect employees’ own disability expertise and are often
the least expensive option.313 This, too, would avoid needless resort to
medical documentation. If an employee requests an ergonomic keyboard, a
doctor who has never entered the employee’s workplace should not be
required to endorse the keyboard request.
Eliminating medical documentation requirements is an approach
consistent with disability justice, which is sensitive to the law’s impact on
marginalized individuals.314 Those who are unable to use paid leave to visit
a medical provider to obtain medical documentation of disability are
impacted by a documentation requirement. The same is true of individuals
whose doctors charge a fee to complete disability verification forms—a fee
that the patient cannot afford to pay.
It takes a certain amount of privilege to have the opportunity to discuss
disability documentation with a health care provider, let alone actually obtain
it. Power dynamics between doctors and patients render that conversation
difficult for some but not others, depending on, for example, the patient’s

313. See supra Part II.A.
314. “Disability justice aims to expand from the individual rights framework to highlight
the impact of disability on certain populations, especially the poor, people of color, and
women.” Seema Mohapatra, Politically Correct Eugenics, 12 FIU L. REV. 51, 78 (2016).
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race, gender, and class.315 Moreover, systemic racism is deeply embedded
in U.S. health care. Health care providers routinely disregard and undertreat
the pain reported by people of color and by Black women in particular.316 A
system that allows Black women to die from treatable conditions due to the
suspicion that accompanies their self-reported symptoms is not one in which
each individual has the same access to documentation that would suffice to
prove disability. To the extent that medical documentation requirements ask
doctors to believe that the individual requesting the documentation deserves
it, people of color will be disproportionately affected by concerns that
disabled people are faking their disabilities.317
Of course, abandoning medical documentation of disability is likely to
cause great discomfort. There will be outcries about floodgates and fakery.
Failure-to-accommodate claims will be more likely to succeed and will
trigger new guidance and training for employers accustomed to questioning,
rather than accepting, disability. But the ADA was intended to be radical,
and radical change is uncomfortable.318
Frank conversations about disability are in order. But doctors do not need
to mediate or even participate in them. After all, doctors are not omniscient.
They can diagnose and treat impairments, but they have no specialized
knowledge of “the social and political conditions that place barriers in the
way of . . . impairment[s]”—the very barriers that create disability.319 They
may be ill-equipped to suggest accommodations in a workplace they have
never entered and for work they have never observed.
“In everyday interactions, people with disabilities have, and need more,
opportunities to educate employers, agencies, and peers about their

315. Cf. Belt & Dorfman, supra note 312, at 176–77 (stating that the disability community
“comprises people of different genders, classes, and races, and who experience different types
of stigma and discriminatory patterns”).
316. See Ada Stewart, Black Physician’s COVID Death Underscores Health Disparities,
AAFP: LEADER VOICES BLOG (Jan. 15, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.aafp.org/news/blogs/
leadervoices/entry/20210115lv-coviddisparities.html [http://perma.cc/PE69-XEUA]; see also
TRESSIE MCMILLAN COTTOM, THICK AND OTHER ESSAYS 86–89 (2019); Janika Best, Note,
Where Is My Seat at the Table: How Informed Consent Laws Foster the Legacy of Slavery
and Discrimination Against Black Women, 41 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 1, 2 (2019).
317. In other contexts, identity documentation requirements have a disproportionate effect
on people of color, the poor, and the elderly. See Tracey B. Carter, Post-Crawford: Were
Recent Changes to State Voter ID Laws Really Necessary to Prevent Voter Fraud and Protect
the Electoral Process?, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 283, 301 (2013) (discussing how photo
identification requirements impact voting rights); Julie Mitchell & Susan Bibler Coutin, Living
Documents in Transnational Spaces of Migration Between El Salvador and the United States,
44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 865, 886–87 (2019) (discussing how increases in anti-immigrant
sentiment caused “increased documentation requirements” which have “spillover effects on
US citizens,” creating obstacles for “women, the poor, the elderly, people of color, the US
citizen children of immigrant parents, and anyone who does not have their identity documents
at hand”).
318. Basas, supra note 31, at 65.
319. Rovner, supra note 20, at 1051–52 (quoting Lennard J. Davis, Bending Over
Backwards: Disability, Narcissism, and the Law, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 210
(2000)).
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experiences of disability.”320 As Carrie Griffin Basas explains, “people with
disabilities need to be at the center of the ADA; it is their/our civil rights
statute, about us, for us, and ultimately, an effort to be undertaken with us.”321
CONCLUSION
This Article has highlighted the agency guidance that led to the current
documentation-dependent interactive process. It also explained how medical
documentation requirements conflict with the ADA’s legislative history and
its purposeful abandonment of the medical model of disability. It proposes a
familiar and simple fix: borrowing the hands-off approach already known to
employers and courts who consider religious accommodations. Lessening or
eliminating medical documentation requirements will make reasonable
accommodations less expensive, less time-consuming, and easier to obtain.
It will also center employees’ own expertise, empowering people with
disabilities to create their own solutions. Guidance to the contrary should not
be followed.
Freeing disability from documentation requirements could also
revolutionize how accommodation requests are treated in higher education in
general and legal education in particular. Laura Rothstein has highlighted
unresolved issues surrounding disability documentation requirements
imposed by the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC),322 state bar
examiners, and law schools.323 For example, some law schools reject
documentation of disability that they consider outdated, even when past
documentation establishes that a student has a permanent disability.324 As a
320. Basas, supra note 31, at 114.
321. Id.
322. The LSAC has, in the past, treated reasonable accommodation as a privilege rather
than a tool that ensures equal opportunity for students with disabilities. It also went to great
lengths to undo the perceived benefit students with disabilities purportedly received as a result
of extra-time accommodations. Until 2014, LSAC flagged the LSAT scores of students who
received an extra-time accommodation, informing law schools that their test scores “may not
be representative or accurate of a law school candidate’s abilities since it was not taken under
standard timing conditions.” Haley Moss, Extra Time Is A Virtue: How Standardized Testing
Accommodations After College Throw Students with Disabilities Under the Bus, 13 ALB.
GOV’T L. REV. 201, 220 (2020). The practice ceased as a result of a consent decree entered in
a lawsuit brought by the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. See
Jonathan Lazar, The Use of Screen Reader Accommodations by Blind Students in Standardized
Testing: A Legal and Socio-Technical Framework, 48 J.L. & EDUC. 185, 201–02 (2019).
Technical guidance issued in 2015 by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division
explains that “[f]lagging announces to anyone receiving the exam scores that the test-taker has
a disability and suggests that the scores are not valid or deserved” and “discourages test-takers
with disabilities from exercising their right to testing accommodations under the ADA for fear
of discrimination.” Id. at 202 (quoting Testing Accommodations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R.
DIV., https://www.ada.gov/regs2014/testing_accommodations.html [https://perma.cc/PB6E38FP] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021)). It is difficult to comprehend how this ableist policy
survived as long as it did or why it existed at all.
323. See Laura Rothstein, Forty Years of Disability Policy in Legal Education and the
Legal Profession: What Has Changed and What Are the New Issues?, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 519, 570–74 (2014).
324. Based on conversations with disabled law students and disabled alumni, it is my
understanding that this is a common, albeit often unwritten, rule that treats certain learning
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result, disabled students must obtain and pay for new documentation,325
which may require submitting to a battery of tests.326 When documentation
can only be obtained following a medical appointment, students may miss
class and waste valuable study time.327
Law students with disabilities also face unique obstacles in connection
with their bar exam preparations. They must complete the same extensive
paperwork as their peers in addition to paperwork related to their reasonable
accommodations requests, including those that require medical
documentation.
Inconsistent and untimely decisions regarding the
administration of state bar examinations during the COVID-19 pandemic
were particularly burdensome for students with disabilities. Some students
who received time-related accommodations were forced to choose between
taking an accommodated examination in person or taking an
unaccommodated test virtually.328 Students who sought accommodations for
the first time as a result of, for example, their compromised immune systems,
had to procure medical documentation on unforgiving timelines.
Abandoning medical documentation requirements would improve the
experience of students with disabilities who take the LSAT, law students with
disabilities, and law graduates with disabilities.
“Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the well
and in the kingdom of the sick,” and “sooner or later each of us is obliged, at
least for a spell, to identify ourselves as citizens of that other place.”329 The
same might be said of disability,330 with the COVID-19 pandemic serving as
a very long spell in which our understanding of disability and identity
evolved. The pandemic not only highlighted the importance of streamlining
the reasonable accommodations process, it created a new class of individuals

disability diagnoses as stale three years after the diagnoses are obtained. It is also my
understanding that this practice is intended to render accommodations based on learning
disabilities harder, if not impossible, to obtain. It is not a rule based in science.
325. Rothstein, supra note 323, at 574.
326. Id. at 573.
327. I have previously argued that any “extra time” a student with disabilities receives to
take a midterm or final exam is far outweighed by the time that student loses to the pursuit of
medical documentation of disability. Katherine Macfarlane, Testing Accommodations Are Not
a Gift of Extra Time, MS. JD (Jan. 10, 2019), https://ms-jd.org/blog/article/testingaccommodations-are-not-a-gift-of-extra-time [http://perma.cc/6QW5-TWKX].
328. See, e.g., Maria Dinzeo, Disabled Law Grads Get No Relief from Covid-Era State Bar
Exam, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/
disabled-law-grads-get-no-relief-from-covid-era-state-bar-exam/
[http://perma.cc/A8JT7QL7].
329. Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Jan. 26, 1978),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1978/01/26/illness-as-metaphor/ [http://perma.cc/Y3RNAGWV].
330. See CDC: 1 in 4 US Adults Live with a Disability, CDC NEWSROOM (Aug. 16, 2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2018/p0816-disability.html
[http://perma.cc/7FWDV2A4] (“At some point in their lives, most people will either have a disability or know
someone who has a one.”) .
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with chronic, long-term disabilities known as COVID long haulers.331 Long
haulers experience the lingering effects of a COVID-19 infection long after
they have recovered from it.332 And like so many disabled people, long
haulers have already had their disability questioned. The Wall Street Journal
published an op-ed describing long-term COVID-19 as “largely an invention
of vocal patient activist groups.”333
I began this project in 2019, interested in uncovering the origins of the
medical documentation requirement.
The project took on greater
significance as people around the country struggled to convince their
employers that because they are high-risk for serious illness from
COVID-19, they must work from home. Based on my own anecdotal
experience assisting friends, students, and colleagues, employers did not
relax medical documentation requirements during the pandemic. And,
perhaps due to political leanings, or sheer burnout, some doctors refused to
back up a work-from-home request.
How did it get this bad? Cruelty may be the point—a system so intent on
ferreting out fakery is not a system interested in access, let alone fairness. I
was not surprised to find evidence of imposing medical documentation
requirements in the case law, but I was surprised that no scholarship
challenges it. I believe this is due to the relatively small number of people
with disabilities in legal academia who also write about disability law.334
The research undertaken in connection with this Article was inspired, in
part, by my own experience with disability and reasonable accommodations.
I am disabled due to a decades-long battle with rheumatoid arthritis (RA).
My medical records could fill a room. Nevertheless, my reasonable
accommodations requests have been delayed or denied for a myriad of
reasons. The State Bar of California originally denied my bar exam
accommodation request to take off-the-clock stretching breaks, away from
the exam itself. The bar did not question my disability but rather rejected my
accommodation submission because two different sets of handwriting
331. See, e.g., Claire Pomeroy, A Tsunami of Disability Is Coming as a Result of ‘Long
COVID,” SCI. AM. (July 6, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-tsunami-ofdisability-is-coming-as-a-result-of-lsquo-long-covid-rsquo/ [http://perma.cc/4DQT-2A3K].
332. See Tae Chung et al., COVID ‘Long Haulers’: Long-Term Effects of COVID-19,
JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditionsand-diseases/coronavirus/covid-long-haulers-long-term-effects-of-covid19 [http://perma.cc/
W2P3-QFA5].
333. Jeremy Devine, Opinion, The Dubious Origins of Long Covid, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22,
2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dubious-origins-of-long-covid-11616452583
[http://perma.cc/S5EF-ATSX].
334. I am grateful to disability law scholars like Nicole Buonocore Porter and Katie Eyer,
who have written about their own experiences with disability. See generally, e.g., Nicole
Buonocore Porter, What Disability Means to Me: When the Personal and Professional
Collide, 5 HOUS. L. REV. OFF THE REC. 119 (2015); Katie Eyer, Am I Disabled?: Disability
Identity and Law Faculty, J. LEGAL EDUC. (forthcoming 2021). I also recognize and honor
disabled scholars who write about disability without publicly identifying as disabled. There
are many reasons why one may not claim disability, including the overwhelming
discrimination still faced by people with disabilities in the workplace. Claiming my own
disability has come at great professional expense.
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appeared on one of the forms documenting my RA. On the form in question,
I filled in my name and address, and my doctor filled in and signed the rest.
That was unacceptable, and the form had to be redone on an accelerated
timeline during the final, stressful weeks of bar exam study. Before I had a
name for it, I was experiencing the consequences of fear of the disability con.
Another reasonable accommodations request denial bordered on the
absurd. I once asked an employer for a keyboard tray, which I needed due to
range of motion limitations in my left elbow. A keyboard tray renders
computer work much more comfortable. Without it, I must hold my left arm
at an angle that causes me significant pain. In connection with my keyboard
tray request, I provided medical records establishing that I have RA, a disease
that is not rare, and which is known to cause joint pain and limit the affected
joints’ range of motion. In other words, my disability, and my need for the
accommodation, were obvious. Still, the keyboard tray accommodation was
denied because I did not produce a letter from my doctor stating that I needed
a keyboard tray.
At the time of my keyboard tray request, I had just moved to a new town
in a rural part of the country. I had yet to establish care with a local
rheumatologist—the closest one was located nearly two hours away from my
new home. I did not know when I would find time to see a new
rheumatologist. After all, I had just begun my tenure-track career, and I
wanted to spend my time preparing for class and writing scholarship. I
wanted to settle in. I also did not want my first visit with a new provider to
be monopolized by a conversation about accommodations.
I tried to persuade my employer to give me a keyboard tray by sharing an
x-ray of my left elbow and an accompanying radiologist’s report detailing
the bone spurs and edema plaguing the joint. But that, too, was not enough
to secure a keyboard tray.
Finally, a rheumatologist whose care I was no longer under agreed to sign
her name to a letter stating something akin to “please provide Katherine
Macfarlane with ergonomic office furniture.” Soon after, the keyboard tray
appeared. In the interim, I worked without a keyboard tray while my elbow
throbbed with pain. I did not have the luxury of halting work until the tray
arrived.
My story is not unique. Like many others, my accommodations have been
hard fought. Still, to understand just how broken our reasonable
accommodations regime has become, you may have to first suffer through a
denied accommodations request. And even still, you need the fortitude to
write about it.

